Tackling China: A New Approach to Foreign Policy

Foreign Secretary, Vijay Gokhale’s note to the Cabinet Ministry to issue an directive to Govt. servants not to participate in the events, starting April 1st, planned to commemorate the 60^th anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s exile from Tibet to India is, perhaps, to smoothen Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Qingdao, in June this year to attend the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) meeting; or was it is a quid pro quo to muster Chinese withdrawal of opposition to Pak being put on the “Grey list” by the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) on terror financing? Prompting the Dalai Lama to visit Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh, or the Tibetans to protest when wanting to needle the Chinese & swinging the other way as in this case, though viewed as a legitimate action under foreign policy is in bad moral taste & against the host – guest relationship defined in our country by “Atithi Devo Bhava”.

I have long argued that despite our ambition to see ourselves as China’s peer, the dichotomy in economic sizes is substantial with China boasting of 5 times our GDP (Gross Domestic Product) & about 3.5 times our military budget (India$51 billion vs. China’s $175 billion). But since economic sizes of the two countries were similar till about 1980 & per capita incomes till 1991, our ambition is not misplaced since the power differential would be substantially reduced in a 25 year timeframe if the elephant grows at least 1.5 times the dragon. Till such time, we need to play with caution even while asserting where necessary to protect our core interests for China is using coercive diplomatic, economic & military pressures to browbeat nations to gain territory & market access.

Managing China: Strategies

The Quad (US-India-Australia-Japan) strengthened by the addition of like-minded countries in the ASEAN like Vietnam could logically serve to deter China from pursuing a “creeping acquisition” of territory strategy; however, pertinent to note that during the Doklam standoff the US did not come out opening in India’s support; only Japan did & in a non-Shinzo Abe scenario we cannot expect such emphatic support from the Nippon nation too. While China blisters at such encirclement, our attempts at strengthening the alliance should be pursued, especially since China has made deep inroads into SAARC nations & beyond.

Ambassador, KC Singh, however, argues that India is a “swing” power in a post unipolar world scenario where the sole superpower – the US - is on a decline & displaying withdrawal symptoms under Trump & a revisionist power – China – is not only on the rise but displaying greater risk appetite to shift the world epicentre to Asia; he proposes that India with the 3^rd largest military & economic power (in PPP terms) should maintain a balance to protect our interests even as others have proposed “Strategic Autonomy”.  In areas like climate change, free trade etc. India sees convergence with China while in areas like freedom of navigation in South/East China sea & beyond, propagation of democratic values etc. our interests conflate with those of the US.

Suhasini Haider, vide an article in the Hindu, has argued that we could delineate Chinese actions/ strategies under 3 heads: helpful to India; neither helpful nor inimical to India’s interests: & inimical to India. She advises co-operation in the first, co-existence in the second & assertion/alternate offer if need be along with the Quad in the third. Salvatore Babones, writing in Forbes asserts that India’s “Act East” needs China while the latter’s “Go West” needs India since China has excess capacity in construction & infrastructure industries & needs markets while India has the market but lacks infrastructure. He reasons that Indian economy at $2.5 trillion is roughly the size of ASEAN & positively dwarfs the economies of Central Asian Republics - where China is trying to gain leeway.  India thus can absorb a meaningful proportion of China’s excess capacity. Even while Manipur is closer to Chinese Chengdu rather than Thai Bangkok, India is keen to connect the two in a bid to seek additional manufacturing investments in the North East from the ASEAN which is unlikely to fructify; likewise, Chinese interest in rebuilding the Stilwell road that links Assam to China is stonewalled due to political opposition from India. He laments that the only country that has the capital & technology to help India’s North East is the last country India wants to turn too. Perhaps, opposition is a consequence of Indian security considerations predicated by the unresolved border dispute; would India think differently if the border issue is resolved favourably – the McMahon line becomes the de-jure border?

Shifting sights to the country’s North West, India has opposed the CPEC (China – Pak Economic Corridor) – part of President Xi’s pet BRI (Belt & Road Initiative) – because of sovereignty concerns since it passes through Gilgit-Baltistan – a part of undivided J&K - on which India has an unresolved bilateral dispute with Pak. Ceding of the Shaksgam valley by Pak to China, in 1963, effectively makes the J&K dispute a tripartite one & the Karakoram highway was subsequently constructed. China skilfully circumvented India’s sovereignty objections then by introducing a clause that promised to respect sovereignty of the territory as & when it was finally resolved, perhaps, knowing fully well that it will take decades; 50 years hence, Gilgit Baltistan & POK remain part of Pak. When India is finding it difficult managing the aspirations of the people in the Kashmir valley alone, would she not find it difficult managing additional territory & people even if Pak hands over the disputed territories to India? Can the tripartite problem be resolved by an agreement to convert the LOC with Pak as the de facto border & recognition of India claims over the Siachen heights in lieu of withdrawal of Indian sovereignty claims - over Gilgit- Baltistan & POK - & support to CPEC under a new nom-de-plume by linking it to the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial corridor to gain access to Central Asia? This deal though pragmatic could pique of our Western allies since it is a reversal of their strategy of denying the communists' access to the Arabian Sea since imperial times; can India stop  China from pushing through with the CPEC project & the proposed corridor linking Kyauk Pyu port in Myanmar with China, gaining access to both the Arabian Sea & Bay of Bengal?  

Connecting CPEC to the Delhi Mumbai industrial corridor would give us access to Central Asia without expending energy & money on the Iranian port of Chabahar & an alternate route via Afghanistan to central Asia.  Iran is a tough negotiator & has given India access to the port for 18 months only. India, unable to fund its own infra requirements cannot spend adequately on the Iran-Af-Central Asia linkage or the North- South Corridor to provide access to Eurasia vide the Caspian sea; even if she did, it would only increase Iran’s geostrategic importance & not India’s. Would taking advantage of China’s investments not be a better strategy rather than becoming captive to Iran’s belligerence or  blackmail?

In 1959-60, The Chinese Premier, Zhou-en-Lai proposed an India concession on the Western sector at Aksai Chin in lieu of Chinese concession in the eastern sector of Tawang to settle the border issue which effectively meant recognition of  the McMahon line, of 1914, & the McCartney-McDonald line, of 1899, which PM Nehru, unfortunately, rejected & followed through with the ill thought through “Forward post policy” which led to the Indo-China war, of 1962, post which China occupies the entire Aksai chin, much beyond the McCartney-McDonald line. Can India & China agree on the McMahon & McCartney-McDonald lines in lieu of India allowing Chinese access beyond the BMIC (Bangladesh-Myanmar-India-China) corridor to the NBBMIC (Nepal-Bhutan-Bangladesh-Myanmar-India-China) corridor & greater market access, contingent on reducing the trade deficit?

Conclusion

It might be prudent to take advantage of aligning with China on climate change, handling terror, alternative world financial architecture & participating in parts of the BRI (Belt & Road Initiative) wherever we see an advantage & put our foot down where we see our interests challenged by offering an alternative model. Issuing demarches to SAARC nations not to cross the Red line of accessing Chinese investments, on what we perceive as dual use projects, that challenge our security interests is not working with even nations like Maldives revolting; offering them a better financial package & economic model – perhaps along with our other Quad allies - is a better alternative. Despite the brave averments of our Army Chief is India ready for “a two & a half front war”? Even if "yes", a war is regressive as much as it is unlikely. Prudent for India to borrow a line from the former Chinese strongman, Deng Xiaoping: “Hide our capabilities & bide our time”.