Run up towards The 2019 Parliamentary elections

A week, they say, is a long time in politics. Journalists - who were gushing at the unstoppable Modi-Shah juggernaut, post the BJP govt. formation in the North Eastern states of Tripura, Nagaland & Meghalaya – are now convinced of BJP’s vincibility, in 2019 – post the SP win in the UP by elections – with BSP support -  & the exit of the TDP from the NDA on the issue of denial of “special category status”.  Lack of rigour in analysis & swinging like trapeze artists & changing positions with each event does the profession no good.

Let us step back & analyse the current political landscape

(1)The BJP that won 282 seats in 2014, now has its nos. reduced to 276, post losing 6 of the 10 seats - it held earlier - that went to the by polls later- Ratlam (MP to INC in 2015), Gurdaspur (Punjab to INC in 2017), Alwar & Ajmer (Raj to INC in 2018), Phulpur & Gorakhpur (UP to SP in 2018) indicating the onset of anti-incumbency.

Takeaway: The GOP, the INC, has its footprint sequentially reduced from the days of Indira Gandhi & is now shrunk to fighting the BJP directly in 14 of the 29 states only: Western India(Gujarat), Central India(MP & Chhattisgarh), North Western India(Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan), Northern India(Uttarakhand & HP) & South (Karnataka, Telangana) & North East (Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh)while it is still a formidable force along with allies in 4 states: North(J&K with the NC), West(Maharashtra with the NCP; Goa), South (Kerala as UDF). The regional parties dominate the remaining landscape - largely in the South & East - prompting TMC’s Derek-o-Brein to comment that the BJP should be stopped by the regional parties in their areas of dominance while the INC does in its backyard, to propel India back into a liberal, inclusive coalition era.

 (2)BJP  ruled 6 states in 2014 – Gujarat, Rajasthan, MP, Chhattisgarh, Goa, & Punjab (in alliance with SAD; between 2014 to 2019, it lost Punjab but retained Gujarat in a cliff-hanger & Goa vide a coalition despite the verdict being anti-BJP.  It added 14 new states – HP, Haryana, Uttarakhand, UP, Jharkhand, Assam & runs govt. coalition governments in  Maharashtra(with Shiv Sena), J&K (with PDP), Bihar(with JDU), Tripura(with IPFT), Meghalaya(NPP), Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Nagaland riding as much on Amit Shah's poll strategy as much as on anti-incumbency against existing state governments.

Takeaway: The BJP gained massively in 2014 & beyond due to anti –incumbency against the INC & Regional parties; going forward, ruling as it does 19 of the 29 states, would it too not be at the receiving end of the same trend in both in the impending Parliamentary & Assembly elections?

(3)The State BJP CMs of the newly acquired states are generally seen as lacking in administrative acumen & might not be in a position to regain power the next time. The anti- incumbency vectors are corruption, lack of employment opportunities, & price rise. The Modi govt. which retained the sheen of being corruption free is now weighed down by the patina of the corruption in the Rafale deal, Nirav Modi's PNB scam, Jay Amit Shah’s sudden riches etc.; likewise, the govt. has not been able to show an appreciable increase in employment opportunities & the PMs allusion to “Pakoda sellers” as new jobs has ruffled feathers. Inflation was been kept in check vide an unexpected bonanza of an oil price drop & a public policy decision to go for a minor rise in MSP; however, the latter decision has led to rural angst & rise in farmer suicides; the farmer march in Maharashtra is a consequence of the same malady.  The usual suspects are thus now rising in unison.

Takeaway: There are issues to corner the Modi govt. if the opposition can weave the right narrative taking advantage of the emerging situation. With Nitish co-opted, Chidambaram entangled in legal mess & Rahul suffering from the “pappu jibes” & Mamata & Mayawati unable to acquire the leadership of the opposition mantle it will a case of “distributed leadership” fighting the BJP’s electoral machine which in a way is good for the opposition since a direct fight between an opposition leader & Modi would make the contest “Presidential” – a situation NaMo shall savour.

(4)While the TDP had existed the coalition & initiated a no confidence motion against the govt. the BJP could win this round but is precariously placed since Uddhav Thackeray of the  Shiv Sena has already announced that they would contest the 2019 elections without the BJP, Naresh Gujral of the SAD has opined that the single party rule is off in 2019 & the BJP should therefore consult its allies more while the JD(U) in Bihar is sulking for want of special category status & more representation at the centre.

Takeaway: The NDA is in a mess & in a bid to dominate from the "Panchayat to Parliament" the BJP is in no mood to apply the balm.

Against this background we could reasonably make the following predictions for the next parliamentary elections

(a)The BJP would suffer from anti-incumbency & is unlikely to repeat its 2014 performance:  Gujarat (26/26), Rajasthan (25/25), Haryana (7/10), Madhya Pradesh (27/29), Chhattisgarh (10/11), Maharashtra (23/48); it would lose about 50 seats in these states. A neck & neck fight between the INC & the BJP is thus predicted in 2019 with each party winning about 140 seats.

(b)In UP, a SP-BSP-INC combination with a vote share close to 50% could potentially sweep the polls; however since arithmetic might not translate into chemistry, the coalition is predicted to win 60 seats, unless a Ram Janmabhoomi agitation, perhaps, post an adverse judgement, in Oct 2018, in the Supreme Court, is likely to create polarization catapulting the BJP to about 55 seats – similar to the no. it earned in the 1990’s. That would push the BJP to about 175 seats - still about 100 seats short of a majority.

(c)Despite leaders like KCR wanting to lead the third front, it appears more a strategy to sweep polls in their home state i.e. do what Modi did in Gujarat, or Jaya in TN or Mamata in WB, in 2014 – thereby becoming a  kingmaker rather than a king, in 2019.

(d)Allies view the BJP leadership as arrogant, non-consulting & intent on playing a zero sum game; this makes acquiring new friends / allies pre or post poll difficult for the BJP.

Conclusion

With Ram Janmabhoomi agitation/building a temple likely to spur “polarization” & a skirmish in the Pak border or Indian intervention in Maldives to ratchet up “nationalism” a possibility, it is feasible for the BJP to emerge as the single largest party but due to lack of friends/allies, it would be forced to cede power to the INC to form the govt. with the support of the regional parties.

Tackling China: A New Approach to Foreign Policy

Foreign Secretary, Vijay Gokhale’s note to the Cabinet Ministry to issue an directive to Govt. servants not to participate in the events, starting April 1st, planned to commemorate the 60^th anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s exile from Tibet to India is, perhaps, to smoothen Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Qingdao, in June this year to attend the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) meeting; or was it is a quid pro quo to muster Chinese withdrawal of opposition to Pak being put on the “Grey list” by the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) on terror financing? Prompting the Dalai Lama to visit Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh, or the Tibetans to protest when wanting to needle the Chinese & swinging the other way as in this case, though viewed as a legitimate action under foreign policy is in bad moral taste & against the host – guest relationship defined in our country by “Atithi Devo Bhava”.

I have long argued that despite our ambition to see ourselves as China’s peer, the dichotomy in economic sizes is substantial with China boasting of 5 times our GDP (Gross Domestic Product) & about 3.5 times our military budget (India$51 billion vs. China’s $175 billion). But since economic sizes of the two countries were similar till about 1980 & per capita incomes till 1991, our ambition is not misplaced since the power differential would be substantially reduced in a 25 year timeframe if the elephant grows at least 1.5 times the dragon. Till such time, we need to play with caution even while asserting where necessary to protect our core interests for China is using coercive diplomatic, economic & military pressures to browbeat nations to gain territory & market access.

Managing China: Strategies

The Quad (US-India-Australia-Japan) strengthened by the addition of like-minded countries in the ASEAN like Vietnam could logically serve to deter China from pursuing a “creeping acquisition” of territory strategy; however, pertinent to note that during the Doklam standoff the US did not come out opening in India’s support; only Japan did & in a non-Shinzo Abe scenario we cannot expect such emphatic support from the Nippon nation too. While China blisters at such encirclement, our attempts at strengthening the alliance should be pursued, especially since China has made deep inroads into SAARC nations & beyond.

Ambassador, KC Singh, however, argues that India is a “swing” power in a post unipolar world scenario where the sole superpower – the US - is on a decline & displaying withdrawal symptoms under Trump & a revisionist power – China – is not only on the rise but displaying greater risk appetite to shift the world epicentre to Asia; he proposes that India with the 3^rd largest military & economic power (in PPP terms) should maintain a balance to protect our interests even as others have proposed “Strategic Autonomy”.  In areas like climate change, free trade etc. India sees convergence with China while in areas like freedom of navigation in South/East China sea & beyond, propagation of democratic values etc. our interests conflate with those of the US.

Suhasini Haider, vide an article in the Hindu, has argued that we could delineate Chinese actions/ strategies under 3 heads: helpful to India; neither helpful nor inimical to India’s interests: & inimical to India. She advises co-operation in the first, co-existence in the second & assertion/alternate offer if need be along with the Quad in the third. Salvatore Babones, writing in Forbes asserts that India’s “Act East” needs China while the latter’s “Go West” needs India since China has excess capacity in construction & infrastructure industries & needs markets while India has the market but lacks infrastructure. He reasons that Indian economy at $2.5 trillion is roughly the size of ASEAN & positively dwarfs the economies of Central Asian Republics - where China is trying to gain leeway.  India thus can absorb a meaningful proportion of China’s excess capacity. Even while Manipur is closer to Chinese Chengdu rather than Thai Bangkok, India is keen to connect the two in a bid to seek additional manufacturing investments in the North East from the ASEAN which is unlikely to fructify; likewise, Chinese interest in rebuilding the Stilwell road that links Assam to China is stonewalled due to political opposition from India. He laments that the only country that has the capital & technology to help India’s North East is the last country India wants to turn too. Perhaps, opposition is a consequence of Indian security considerations predicated by the unresolved border dispute; would India think differently if the border issue is resolved favourably – the McMahon line becomes the de-jure border?

Shifting sights to the country’s North West, India has opposed the CPEC (China – Pak Economic Corridor) – part of President Xi’s pet BRI (Belt & Road Initiative) – because of sovereignty concerns since it passes through Gilgit-Baltistan – a part of undivided J&K - on which India has an unresolved bilateral dispute with Pak. Ceding of the Shaksgam valley by Pak to China, in 1963, effectively makes the J&K dispute a tripartite one & the Karakoram highway was subsequently constructed. China skilfully circumvented India’s sovereignty objections then by introducing a clause that promised to respect sovereignty of the territory as & when it was finally resolved, perhaps, knowing fully well that it will take decades; 50 years hence, Gilgit Baltistan & POK remain part of Pak. When India is finding it difficult managing the aspirations of the people in the Kashmir valley alone, would she not find it difficult managing additional territory & people even if Pak hands over the disputed territories to India? Can the tripartite problem be resolved by an agreement to convert the LOC with Pak as the de facto border & recognition of India claims over the Siachen heights in lieu of withdrawal of Indian sovereignty claims - over Gilgit- Baltistan & POK - & support to CPEC under a new nom-de-plume by linking it to the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial corridor to gain access to Central Asia? This deal though pragmatic could pique of our Western allies since it is a reversal of their strategy of denying the communists' access to the Arabian Sea since imperial times; can India stop  China from pushing through with the CPEC project & the proposed corridor linking Kyauk Pyu port in Myanmar with China, gaining access to both the Arabian Sea & Bay of Bengal?  

Connecting CPEC to the Delhi Mumbai industrial corridor would give us access to Central Asia without expending energy & money on the Iranian port of Chabahar & an alternate route via Afghanistan to central Asia.  Iran is a tough negotiator & has given India access to the port for 18 months only. India, unable to fund its own infra requirements cannot spend adequately on the Iran-Af-Central Asia linkage or the North- South Corridor to provide access to Eurasia vide the Caspian sea; even if she did, it would only increase Iran’s geostrategic importance & not India’s. Would taking advantage of China’s investments not be a better strategy rather than becoming captive to Iran’s belligerence or  blackmail?

In 1959-60, The Chinese Premier, Zhou-en-Lai proposed an India concession on the Western sector at Aksai Chin in lieu of Chinese concession in the eastern sector of Tawang to settle the border issue which effectively meant recognition of  the McMahon line, of 1914, & the McCartney-McDonald line, of 1899, which PM Nehru, unfortunately, rejected & followed through with the ill thought through “Forward post policy” which led to the Indo-China war, of 1962, post which China occupies the entire Aksai chin, much beyond the McCartney-McDonald line. Can India & China agree on the McMahon & McCartney-McDonald lines in lieu of India allowing Chinese access beyond the BMIC (Bangladesh-Myanmar-India-China) corridor to the NBBMIC (Nepal-Bhutan-Bangladesh-Myanmar-India-China) corridor & greater market access, contingent on reducing the trade deficit?

Conclusion

It might be prudent to take advantage of aligning with China on climate change, handling terror, alternative world financial architecture & participating in parts of the BRI (Belt & Road Initiative) wherever we see an advantage & put our foot down where we see our interests challenged by offering an alternative model. Issuing demarches to SAARC nations not to cross the Red line of accessing Chinese investments, on what we perceive as dual use projects, that challenge our security interests is not working with even nations like Maldives revolting; offering them a better financial package & economic model – perhaps along with our other Quad allies - is a better alternative. Despite the brave averments of our Army Chief is India ready for “a two & a half front war”? Even if "yes", a war is regressive as much as it is unlikely. Prudent for India to borrow a line from the former Chinese strongman, Deng Xiaoping: “Hide our capabilities & bide our time”.