The Chinese encroach into Ladakh – the 1962 redux?

In May 2020, while the world was distracted by the COVID -19  crisis, Chinese People Liberation Army (PLA) forces encroached into Ladakh, India, at 4 places – Pangong, Hot Springs, Galwan & Demchok, arguably, usurping about 40-60 sq. Kms of Indian territory. The Agreement on maintaining Peace & Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), 1993, had thrown up 23 areas of dispute, during the Special representative (SR) meetings, over the years, between the two sides, on resolving border disputes that include Pangong & Demchok but not Galwan & Hot Springs or Naku La, Sikkim - another area where fisticuffs & jostling, between the security forces of the two sides was reported on 9th May -  adding credibility to the incursion theory. Capturing the strategic heights of Galwan, the Chinese forces threaten India’s Darbuk Shayok– Daulat Beg Oldie road – the only road link to Strategic Sub Sector North (SSN), Siachin & access thereon towards the Karakoram pass. Sino-Pak interoperability, in this sector, accentuates India’s security risks. Strategic expert & editor of “Force Magazine”, Praveen Sawhney, avers that the military level de-escalation talks that were held on 2^nd & 6^th June failed because the Chinese had taken Galwan off the table. Other reports claim Chinese unwillingness to withdraw from the mountain spur, finger 4, abutting the Pangong Tso - an 8 Kms ingress from finger 8.  However, unattributed leaks published since 9^th June claim “de-escalation” that runs counter to other reports of troop & equipment build-up indicating that the situation is tense. The absence of a joint statement  buttresses the viewpoint.

General Ashok Mehra, writing in The Wire, opines that "deescalation" could mean thinning of troops & material - tents, boats, guns tanks etc. - without the Chinese either being vacated/evicted from the disputed areas. Former Foreign Secretary & National Security Advisor, Shiv Shankar Menon, refers to the policy of "Two Steps Forward; One step Back" followed by China with a "net gain of one step". They could withdraw from certain areas but still retain certain strategic tracks.

Not surprisingly, the jingoism that marks Indo-Pak border tensions is missing from the discourse & has been replaced by calmer & nuanced positions.  There is a video clip, floating in the internet, of Ajit Doval – before he became the NSA, in 2014, stating that the Gross National Power differential between India & China is 3:1 & perhaps that explains the calm & the keenness to arrive at a negotiated settlement.

Pre Independence British India identified the McMahon line in the East – across Arunachal Pradesh - & McDonald’s/Johnson’s  line in the West – across Ladakh - as the border; the latter was breached, in 1962 & China occupied Aksai Chin – a territory of about 38000 Sq. Kms. With power differential, between the two countries, increasing across decades, the Chinese have resorted to a low cost "creeping acquisition" strategy to gain territory – initially nudging shepherds into “Indian” areas for grazing cattle to be later followed by Chinese patrols & finally the informal mud tracks converted into paved ones achieving a fait accompli.

Why Now? – The Timing of the Transgression

The inscrutable Chinese’s actions have been interpreted thus

(1)Drum Up Nationalism: Former Foreign Secretary, Nirupama Rao avers  that “adventurism & expansionism oxygenates China”; upping nationalism now when  China is suffering global condemnation, on the handling of COVID-19 crisis, helps  drum up support for the Chinese Communist Party & divert citizens attention from the economic downturn, jobs losses  & the consequent brewing subterranean angst.

That China has opened multiple fronts simultaneously – Hong Kong, Australia, US, East & South China Seas & India – which is otherwise a less than rational play, indicates, that China wants a violent skirmish - for invoking Nationalism or force the  enemy to genuflect without a fight & gain territory, thereby conveying an  image of “strength” both domestically & internationally. For the effected nations, though, it is a Catch 22 situation – whether to focus on combating the COVID-19 virus or an external aggressor, nothing short of a virus.

(2)Force Status Quo Ante On Article 370: A ‘disputed” J&K with demands for autonomy/ freedom, by local populace, nicely jelled into the Chinese playbook to keep India engaged in internal turmoil which was negated by the stripping of special status granted under Article 370, on 5^th Aug 2019; China objected to the creation of new Union territories (Federal areas) & carried the issue, along with iron brother, Pakistan, to the United Nations, but failed in securing much diplomatic success.

The mention, by Home Minister(HM), Amit Shah, in a parliamentary debate then, of taking  back Aksai Chin apart from POK (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir) that included Gilgit Baltistan - through which passes the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC ) – riled China no end as it challenges its strategic, geographic & economic interests; the  Indian Foreign Ministry tried, unsuccessfully, to douse flames by stating that  while internal changes are rights of a sovereign ,  they do not affect the Line of Actual Control (LAC ). An enraged China, ingressed, as soon as the snows melted, in Mar 2020, leading to the current stalemate. Takeaway: Either the HM should not have mentioned Aksai Chin – keeping it in the grey territory to accord plausible deniability - or should have gamed the likely Chinese response before making the announcement since rhetoric that has a potential to enthuse domestic cadre also carries with it likely deleterious foreign policy implications.

Likewise, Defense Minister, Rajnath Singh, inaugurated the strategic 80 Kms long Ghatiabaragh - Lipulekh road - towards the China-India-Nepal tri-junction -in May, creating a foreign policy crisis since Nepal has competing claims over the disputed territory. A low profile inauguration would have been a better choice. India today thus has China, Pakistan & Nepal breathing down its neck & insurgents in Kashmir waiting for an opportunity - a security challenge.

(3)Impede Indian Infra drive across the border: India till the turn of the last century, did not build infra across the Indo-China borders as an area access denial strategy to the Chinese; however, in response to increased Chinese infrastructure build-up reversed the strategy & has accelerated the process over the last few years inviting the dragon’s displeasure. That explains the increased skirmishes across the border over the last decade, accentuated by an undefined LAC.

Ambassador Gautam Bambawale believes that the Chinese incursion is aimed to accelerate the settlement of the festering border dispute. Do the Chinese presume that India of today can concede territory which a more resurgent one, 20 years later (say), shall not?

(4)Remind India of Chinese Red Lines– In May, BJP MPs Meenakshi Lekhi & Rahul Kaswan attended the swearing in ceremony, of Taiwanese Present Tsai Ing-wen, virtually while acting Director General of Indo-Taipei Association, Sohang Sen, was present physically. China might have viewed this as a case of India overstepping a Chinese red line of the “One China Policy” especially when Tsai has been vocal in opposing reunification with China.

Understanding the Chinese Mind:

A deep insight into the enemy’s mind is an essential prerequisite to predict, with accuracy, their likely moves & be ready with a more than proportionate response.  Better still: Pre-empt.

(1)Superiority Complex: Chinese rightly believe that they are a civilizational power but wrongly arrogate to themselves a superiority complex. Sarvepalli Gopal writes that Chinese Premier, Zhou en Lai expressed angst on how India – a third world power - can claims to have introduced a 1^st world power - China - to the Non Aligned Movement (NAM); this insight reveals that, China shall never accept India as an equal & with both of countries poised to leapfrog into preeminent powers, in the later half of the 21^st century, contestation more than co-operation is the likely way forward. The “Chinese dream” of being the numero uno power, by 2049 – commemorating 100 years of Chinese communist party in power – shall accelerate the inevitable.

Shekhar Gupta, of The Print, recollects Prime Minister Vajpayee disclosing that the Chinese, unlike others, do not believe in giving any concessions during a negotiation.

(2)Regime Preservation Through External Aggression: The famine &  people angst thereof consequent to the failure of the Great Leap Forward (1958-62) was diverted by attacking India in 1962, while the world’s attention was riveted on the likely nuclear Armageddon posed  the Cuban missile crisis; Aksai chin – a strategic territory through which the road connecting Tibet & Xinjiang passes through – was secured then. Earlier, anticipating World War II fatigue induced non-intervention, by the global powers, China gobbled up Tibet.  Now, with the world’s attention diverted towards COVID -19, India suffers another loss of territory while other South Easr Asian nations lose their Exclusive Economic zones.

Strategic Expert, Brahma Chellaney, avers that “”Chinese leaders have claimed military pre-emption as a strategically defensive act” & cites as examples their entry into the Korean War, in 1950 & skirmishes with USSR & Vietnam in 1969 & 1979 respectively. The “string of pearls” strategy of encircling India is operationalization of a Sun Tzu dictum: Contain an adversary by making its neighbourhood hostile. Strategic “deception, concealment & surprise” define Chinese actions.

(3)Shi: Michael Pillsbury, a former dove & now a Chinese hawk, in “The Hundred Year Marathon” lays out how the US was continuously betrayed by China. At the heart of Chinese strategy lies “Shi” – roughly translated into an “alignment of forces” which a skilled strategist can exploit to gain victory. This according to Sun Tzu is to nudge enemies to act in ways that work to his advantage. Ex Mao offered China as a US ally in 1969, against the Soviets, mediated by Pakistan & Singapore; Deng launched his charm offensive, in 1979, & induced the West to fund China's rise under the mistaken presumption, that with rising prosperity China would emerge democratic & accord greater respect to human rights.

He also avers that the Chinese strategies are distilled from the deception induced victories of the warring states period (475 BC – 221 AD). Deception & surprise - advocated by generals like Han Xin & Sun Tzu influence their thoughts. In the modern war theatre they have added psychological ops, legal wars & media wars to the mix making it more potent.

Needless to add, India & China are also fighting a civilizational battle. South Asian fables lionize the Pathans & Rajputs for being sticklers to "promises"even if it invites death (Pran Jaye, Par Vachan Na Jaye) -  while the Chinese accord a premium to ‘cunning” as practiced by the founder of the Han dynasty – Emperor Gaozi (Liu Bang). Perhaps, it is a “culture” thing. The clash of communism / “Socialism with Chinese characteristics: versus democracy is another.

India’s Strengths as seen by outside parties:

Huang Guozhi, senior editor of Modern Weaponry Magazine - affiliated to China North Industries Group Corporation Ltd (NORINCO) - in his article thepaper.cn opines that “the world’s largest & experienced with plateau & mountain experience is neither the US, Russia nor any European powerhouse, but India” & points to the 12 division, 2 lakh troop strong mountain division with plans to raise another 0.5 lakh strike force to buttress his argument.  With the highest outpost at 6749 m over mean sea level, in Siachen, the Indians have gained experience in high altitude warfare by adapting domestic weapons to be used across the plateau & mountains & complemented it  by importing from the US - M777 howitzers, to be transported by heavy lift Chinook helicopters & high calibre sniper rifles -  to boost its firepower & anti-armour capabilities. He cites shortage of ammunition & the lack of co-ordination between the Indian Army (IA) & Air Force(IAF) – forcing IA  to independently procure Apache helicopters, for the Army aviation corps (AAC) - as likely weaknesses.

The Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer centre believes that both India & China have conventional force parity with about 2.25 lakh troops raged against each other. India has about 1.75 Lakh  troops (Including 1000 member strong Brahmos  cruise missile regiment) in the eastern sector,  15,500 troops  in the Middle sector & 34500 (including a 3000 member strong T-72 tank regiment) in the northern sector, forward deployed with a single China defense mission unlike the Chinese forces who are based more deeply inland. China has 0.4 lakh troops in Tibet, 0.7 Lakh troops, in Xinjiang & 0.9- 1.2 Lakh reserves at the Western theatre command at Baoji & Chongqing far away from the border; a significant part of these forces shall be unavailable, reserved as they are either for Russian tasking or combating insurrection in Tibet & Xinjiang.  

The PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) Western Theatre Command has 157 aircrafts apart from other drone armoury arraigned against India while the latter has 270 fighter & 68 ground attack aircrafts across the three commands – Western, Central & Eastern.  The Chinese J-10 is comparable to the Indian Mirage 2000 & the Su 30 MKI is superior to the Chinese J 11 & Su 27.Furthermore, Chinese fighters constrained by the high altitude, in Tiber & Xinjiang, carry only around half their design payload & fuel unlike the Indian aircrafts that take off from the Indian plains with maximum payload & fuel capabilities.

China does have a superiority in missiles though & the likely attacks on Indian airfields has been gamed by the Indians who have a strategy in place - repaving a blast crater with quick drying concrete, in 6 hours, or using the runway replacement fibre-glass mats to make a quicker turnaround.  The Belfer centre concludes that the India is in a stronger conventional position vis a vis China.

India, thus, is no pushover after all.

Crisis Resolution: Options

The crisis can be resolved in 5 possible ways:

(a)Indian forces push back Chinese forces using firepower; a short duration war

(b)India encroaches on Chinese territory of strategic value & negotiates joint withdrawal of both forces

(c)Diplomatic Arm twisting: In 2013, with Chinese forces pitched tents in Depsang, India conveyed to China that in the unlikely case of Chinese withdrawal the upcoming visit of Premier Li Keqiang would be cancelled. The Chinese fell in line.

(d)Of the 4 areas of encroachments, India requests withdrawal in 1-2 areas & the media channels, in India, claim victory. India agrees to withdraw a notification, passed recently, that tightened takeover norms, for Chinese companies, in India, as an incentive.

(e)US-India-Japan-Australia declare QUAD as a military alliance & invite other South East Asian powers like Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines etc. to join the alliance in a bid to protect sovereignty.

Option (d) if adopted shall depress India’s standing further; unable to secure Doklam for protectorate Bhutan, in 2017, has led to angst in the Himalayan kingdom. (a), (b) or (c ) if adopted shall help India gain stature with more countries – currently afraid of the dragon’s ambitions - seeking India’s cover. Option (e) is a medium term option & shall involve sacrifices on strategic autonomy. Democracies – 10 (D-10) proposed by UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson & endorsed by US President Trump as an expanded G7 into G10 – including India, South Korea, Australia – is worth joining.

The presence of social media now, unlike the earlier controllable traditional media,  has given the people of Ladakh, an outlet to voice their bitterness at 70 years of Chinese creeping acquisitions, of their lands. Sonam Wangchuk - on whom the movie "3 idiots" was made - suggests a civilian movement - #BoycottMadeInChina" - Software in a week; Hardware in a year - to hurt her, economically, & inspire an internal revolt.Ambassador Phunchok Stobdan, suggests, that the earlier strategy of Indian forces preventing local civilians from travelling into borderlands - to avoid conflict with the Chinese - should be replaced by allotting 'land ownership' to local shepherds, in the frontier areas, who shall serve, in a way, as the first line of defense. Both the suggestions are worth evaluating.

Way Forward

Strategic affairs expect, C Raja Mohan, writes that analysts who attribute the Chinese action to India’s tilt towards the US are wrong; both US allies, like Philippines or Non Aligned Countries, like Indonesia, have been at the receiving end of a Chinese muscular approach. Philippines – under President Duterte embraced China, by terminating an agreement - that let US troops operate from the country - in Feb 2020, while Indonesia did not subscribe to the US view on a “free & peaceful Indo - Pacific” & worked with the ASEAN to craft an alternate moderate viewpoint - to appease China - without success. China claims Natuna Islands, of Indonesia, now - that is outside their nine dashed line that claims nearly 80% of the South China Sea while also including some islands - on which the Philippines has competing claims,-  under a new Chinese administrative district.

Truth be told: unlike in the past, China has military power to make good its claims he avers & quotes Thucydides: “The strong do what they can & the weak suffer what they must”. The solution: Address power imbalance.

Conclusion

Ambassador Ashok Kanta believes that the Chinese have become more assertive & aggressive & the current incursion is neither localized nor an isolated incident. It is likely that the Chinese military has been asked to push back, replicating the performance of their wolf warrior diplomats. Ambassador Bambawale opines that the current SOPs & drills have failed & in the absence of an agreement on the LAC, such incidents could get triggered in future too.

Clearly, India & China - poised to emerge as the preeminent powers in the later half of the 21st century - are into a clash - both civilizational & of the political models they profess. Relationship between these two great powers shall be defined less by cooperation & more of contestation in the years to come; incursion in  Ladakh is just a trailer.

The Chinese respect power though. They tested India in 1967 at Nathu La & suffered a bloody nose & the border has not seen a bullet fired since 1975. The QUAD is hence the military solution for the medium term & market access denial vide D - 10 the other, to hurt the dragon economically. In coastal China lies the manufacturing infra & India should build capability of threatening same to desist Chinese misadventures; setting up a military base in Vietnam to threaten Canton could aid the objective.

India can get greater bang for the buck - use existing power better - by eliminating operational inefficiencies. The blame game, on intelligence failure, between R&AW & IB on one hand & Military intelligence on the other, that led to the Kargil War, in 1999 or in Ladakh now needs to be evaluated. IA not conducting its regular exercises, in the border areas, this year, due to COVID-19, giving the aggressors a free passage is also disconcerting. Such loopholes needs to be corrected at the earliest.

India has global power ambitions but is today barely a regional power unable to tame even Pakistan. India & Russia spend roughly the same amount - about $60 billion annually - on their military as compared to an US spent of over $700 billion & China $179 billion. But none would dare encroach on Russian territory because of its technological competence - that includes missile defense systems like the S-400 or cyber warfare capabilities - despite suffering from sanctions. Therein lies a clue; the traditional logic advocated about India accelerating its GDP growth that would translate into a higher military spent - even at a flat 2% of GDP military spent annually - though important is not all encompassing.

It is time to spend disproportionately on technology by trimming manpower & creating theatre commands of the army, navy & air-force to ensure optimum utilization of resources. While the Belfar centre data alludes to Indian conventional superiority over China, in the contact kinetic domain, Praveen Sawhney emphasizes need for India to catch up in the non-contact kinetic domain (Missiles) & non-contact non-kinetic theatres of cyber, space & electromagnetic domains. In the interim, manage the smaller bully – China – by aligning with the bigger one – US, even while strengthening QUAD Plus & D-10 / G -10.