Uri attack: What should be India’s response?

The attack on an Army cantonment at Uri, reminiscent of the Pathankot attack, in Jan 2016, by Pak based terrorists, perhaps, of the JeM (Jaish – e Mohammed) resulted in 17 soldiers taken down – burnt in tents to be precise;  one more succumbed to his injuries a day later. Not taking any action would be an act of cowardice said MoS Jitender Singh while the BJP General Secy., Ram Madhav, advocated a jaw for a tooth; sadly a day later their voices were more nuanced leading one to wonder if it was not merely rhetoric. That the Govt. is yet unmoved alludes either to the absence of a strategy or presence of an ineffective one, not executed to prevent embarrassment; neither depict India, with great power ambitions, in great light. A country with expectations of being acknowledged as a “World Power” cannot be tagged even as a “Regional Power” if it cannot tame an intransigent neighbour. Should India not have anticipated such bellicose acts from Pak & planned an effective response beforehand?

The Indian response should be based on only one criterion

Are the Pak armed forces getting weakened by out acts?

Pak for long has been ruled vide a military dictatorship & even in the presence of a civilian administration, the ISI & the army form the real power centre. Talks with a civilian administration are therefore ineffective since they lack the power to execute the promises. Indo-Pak talks have been most effective when a military ruler was in power & it needs no rocket science to assert that negotiation from a position of strength is always a preferred option.

The suggested responses

Diplomatic Options

(1)Withdrawal from the SAARC summit – India should either withdraw from the SAARC summit, planned in Pak this Nov, downgrade it to a ministerial representation  or attend it & along with Afghanistan & Bangladesh – both at the receiving end of Pak’s stick –  wreak the summit. While it shall cause diplomatic embarrassment to Pak, it shall not weaken the military.

(2)Downgrade Diplomatic Relations with Pak: India can expel the Pak High Commissioner or the Defense attache - who definitely must be from the ISI - & withdraw its own Ambassador from Pak before there is reciprocal action from the other side. The effect, unfortunately, shall only be cosmetic.

(3)Declare Pak a terrorist state – India has raised the issue of Pak support to terrorism at the G20 & has urged the UN to include non-state actors too while defining terrorism.  However, all major powers have a dubious history when it comes to supporting terror to achieve geopolitical objectives & hence have cold shouldered the proposal. Any Indian resolution to declare Pak a “terrorist” state is unlikely to find support at the UN, because of the lack of support from the Muslim Ummah - the 57 member OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries) & the GCC (Gulf Co-operation Council) - or torpedoed through a Chinese veto. Even the US would be loath to pursue the option for fear of pushing Pak, further, into a Chinese embrace, losing whatever little leeway it has over the country today.

(4)Push Major powers to stop joint military exercises, military aid or arms sales to Pak – The Russians have cancelled the first ever joint military exercises, planned with Pak; incidentally, plan to sell MI 35 attack helicopters & military exercises was a consequence of India moving closer to the US, much to Russian chagrin, in the recent past. The military sales could still go through. No western country would stop defense sales to Pak unless threatened with denial of bidding into our annual defense capital purchases market, worth about Rs. 70000 crores – amongst the top 2 in the world, with Saudis giving us company. The Chinese, however, would continue to prop up Pak just as they have supported the International pariah, North Korea, nullifying our expected gains.

(5)Support Baloch liberation: Granting asylum to Brahumdagh Bugti & others fighting for the Balochi cause while helping them travel to world capitals to canvass for Baloch independence & bring sharper focus on the human right violations in Balochistan would help; however the collateral damage would be risking a focus on Kashmir. Just as Kurdish Independence from Iraq - Turkey- Syria is not getting international acceptance, Balochi independence too would suffer a similar fate; even the US believes that Balochistan is a indisputable part of Pak. Therefore, but for needling Pak & causing it some headache, this strategy would not take us far unless we use this to wreck the $46 billion  CPEC (China Pak Economic corridor)

(6) Stop Visas & cancel People to people engagements: This is the softest but the most foolhardy option that is generally exercised which merely succeeds in some “signalling” without achieving any strategic goals. When supported by jingoism, prompting the digging of cricket pitches during an Indo-Pak match or forcing the cancellation of the Gulam Ali show, perpetuated by the Shiv Sena, in Mumbai, evoke nothing but discord & sends wrong signals to the international community. It is prudent to allow Pak citizenry to continue to come to India to create a constituency in the civil society of Pak.; offering citizenship to interested personnel, without national security implications, as was done in the case of  Adnan Sami, could start a discussion back home in Pak, creating a better appreciation of India.

Economic Options

(1)Stop trade with Pak or withdraw the MFN status – Annual Trade with Pak is about $7.5 billion, of which 2/3^rd flows through informal channels vide Dubai; India has a trade surplus. Stopping trade would push the entire basket through Dubai & hence shall not pinch Pak; withdrawal of the MFN status shall not help either. Incidentally, the Kashmir fruit trade that happens across the LOC would be severely dented effecting the economic conditions in the valley further. Damaging Pak’s export economy by forcing its largest trading partners EU & the US, by dangling our defense import or the large domestic Indian market carrot, shall help. But this shall be a medium term plan which could be torpedoed if China plays white knight

(2)Threaten China with Trade sanctions: To prevent China from supporting Pak,  India could threaten sanctions. The China – India annual trade is about $70 billion with a trade surplus of about $50 billion in favour of China. But are we in a position to threaten china – a $10 trillion dollar economy, 5 times our size?; the latter could very well put its strategic interests above the trade ones & call our bluff.  Enticing China by granting greater access to the Indian market if they forsake Pak could be a better option; but it would not sail either since an Indo-Pak narrative & not an Indo-China one is seen by China as being in its long term interest.

Military/Covert options

(1)Declare War on Pak: This is unlikely despite our conventional weapon superiority.  While India has the 4^th largest military in the world at 1.3 million with about  $40 billion annual budget, Pak has the 11^th largest military in the world at 0.55 million with a military budget of $7.6 billion apart from being  a nuclear power & hence no pushover. It is unlikely that they would use the nuclear trigger since it would invite Pak’s annihilation too. Mao once called the western bluff, on nuclear war, by asserting  that even if 400 million Chinese perish in the act, the remaining 200 million would continue to build a greater China; Does India have the gall to take a similar stand?

(2)Attack terrorist training grounds: India had attacked the PLA, a Meitei outfit’s camp & NSCN (K) site in Myanmar, as retaliation for the ambush killing of 18 soldiers in Manipur last year. However the sites were deserted when the attack happened, aver some strategic analysts; Pak too keeps changing the locations of the training camps & unless India has concrete information on the sites, a punitive strike would be counter-productive for the diplomatic fallout would most likely dent India’s reputation as a “responsible power”. Pak has a fairly robust air defenses too as per the analyst Cristian Fair.

(3)Take down ISI’s prized assets: Finishing off Dawood, Hafeez Sayeed, Mahsood Azhar et al would cool, partially, the pent up public opinion. This action has to be executed covertly either by our RAW agents or hired mercenaries. Genaral Roy Choudhary wants “non-state actors” to be created to sharpen our covert machinery while VP Malik has confirmed that such an arm was disbanded in the mid 1990’s on political directions; Manohar Parrikar statement in 2015 that a thorn has to be removed by a thorn alludes certainly to some thinking in that direction even as it confirms absence of such capacity today. The point to remember is that such actors could recoil on their patrons, perhaps, creating a Frankenstein monster – as has happened in Pak now; therefore, hiring is always desirable. A covert plan hatched by using hired mercenaries – Pashtuns or the Balochis – should be immediately executed to finish the JeM chief.  

Other options

(1)Cancel the Indus water treaty:  The Indus Water Treaty, signed between India & Pak in 1960 reserves 80.52% of the river water to the lower riparian state; such largesse was, perhaps, meant to be a barter for the still elusive peace. Pak has used the international dispute resolution mechanism to stop India from constructing dams while simultaneously proceeding with its own - the Bunji & the Basha dams with Chinese help. Strategic expert - Brahma Chellaney- argues for annulling the treaty under clause 62 of the Vienna Convention by reason of a fundamental change of circumstances of exporting terror & causing palpable harm to an upper riparian state. Unfortunately, this would hit the people of Pakistan & not the military. This strategy also could depict India as a country which does not respect international treaties & perhaps force China to squeeze the Brahmaputra effecting water flows into the NE.

(2)Cyber Warfare: Being an IT powerhouse, India's capability in this space is miles ahead of Pak. However, sensitive assets, in Pak, must be currently protected through isolation, defeating our strategic resolve. Desecrating more than mere websites should be our aim & that could take time. Since attacks of such nature can never be owned publicly, the  heightened public angst cannot be subdued. Some form of saber rattling in this space could be expected.

Conclusion

None of the options listed above weaken the Pak Military industrial complex.  Even if Pak economy is weakened, affecting the annual budget of Pak military, they are cushioned by the Fauji Foundation which has assets of $20 billion; thus other options like keeping the Pak army engaged in internal disturbances in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa & Sindh, to stress them out, need to be explored. Balkalization of Pak might not help since the Pak army & the ISI are largely drawn from Punjab; disruption in Paki Punjab shall genuinely weaken the Pak army which is what India should target.

For details see http://meetrk.blogspot.in/2016/09/is-balkanisation-of-pak-effective.html

Alas, all these are medium to long term strategies & that perhaps, explains why the Indian govt. is still silent despite the carnage. Gen. Jaswal has argued for taking down a few Pak army pickets, immediately, post the attack; that even such a tactical act was not implemented is surprising for it would not have elicited a more than proportionate response from the other side. With every passing hour the element of surprise is getting lost & patrolling on the other side shall get more robust, reducing the possibility of a retaliation further. It is unlikely that any action would be initiated post the UNGA session comes to a close. Many in the govt. would like us to believe that just as the Indian Armed forces prepared for a few months before launching a war in 1971, a similar exercise is currently underway. Hopefully, the don't do something before the Punjab or the UP elections to gain some advantage as the cancellation of talks with Pak was done earlier to gain an advantage in the then impending J&K elections.

Post the 1971 defeat, in the Indo-Pak war, that led to the creation of Bangladesh, Pak spent the next decade in capability building to launch a blitzkrieg in Punjab in the 1980’s  & Kashmir in the 1990’s. Col Ajai shukla avers that currently India & Pak capabilities are symmetric & the consequences of an attack are far worse than what is generally assumed. China is bound to intervene if they sense the annihilation of Pak; hence we need to be prepared for a war on 2 fronts. Perhaps, India should cease rhetoric, plan adequately & reciprocate in the same coin.

Is Balkanisation of Pak an Effective Strategy?

The successful separation of East Pakistan - known vide its new name of Bangladesh – from West Pakistan in 1971, has convinced many strategic analysts to ponder on the possibility of repeating the surgical act again to tame an intransigent Pakistan. The purported statement by NSA, Ajit Doval, that any repeat of a Mumbai blasts like situation would lead to the dismemberment of Pak sent shock waves through their power elite; perhaps Doval’s reputation as a man who had spent 7 years in Pak, incognito, as a covert agent, could also be a reason for replacing their NSA, Sartaj Aziz with Gen. Janjua.  The reference to Balochistan in the Sharm- El- Sheikh declaration earlier in July 2009, capture of Kulbhushan Yadav by Pak authorities in Mar 2016 & PM Modi clubbing together POK, Gilgit Baltistan & Balochistan during his independence speech, from the ramparts of the Red fort, in Aug 2016 & GOI showing its keenness to accord asylum to Baloch separatists, perhaps, is an indication that this strategy is indeed being taken seriously.

India’s attempts to de-hyphen itself with Pak & be seen as China’s equal by the international community shall always be torpedoed by China; China’s attempts to club India & Pak together for NSG membership falls into this strategic calculus.  With a $10 Trillion dollar economy – the 2^nd largest in the world after the US - & a $146 billion military budget, China wishes to challenge the unipolar world order & appears to be succeeding. China has traditionally treated the East China Sea & South China Sea as its backyard &  engaged in a conflict with Taiwan, Japan & ASEAN;  her claim over the entire South China Sea vide the nine dashed line has suffered a temporary reprieve through, because of the recent judgement of the International Court of Justice.

For details see http://meetrk.blogspot.in/2015/07/geopolitics-of-artificial-islands.html

Its attempts to circumvent India’s ambitions include a “string of pearls” strategy though engagement with Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Myanmar & now Maldives too. China had opened up a route into the Bay of Bengal vide infra development through Myanmar & is now planning a route through Pakistan into the Arabian Sea effecting challenging India in its backyard. This opening also wards off the possibility of getting chocked at the Malacca straits in the event of a war with any enemy country.

 For India’s response read http://meetrk.blogspot.in/2015/05/geopolitics-of-infrastructure-indias.html

The $46 billion CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) that provides unimpeded access to the Arabian Sea, if constructed could smoothen logistics support & India could be inconvenienced in the event of a war on two fronts.

China Pakistan Economic Corridor

Pakistan has 4 provinces Punjab, Sindh, Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa & Balochistan even as they continue to retain hold the disputed territories POK & Gilgit Baltistan known as “Northern Territories”.

CPEC is 3218Kms long, starting at Kashgar in the Western Chinese region of Xinjiang & passing through Gilgit-Baltistan terminates at Gwadar in Balochistan; it consists of pipelines, highways & railways & is expected to be operational by 2020. Economic prosperity & greater integration are expected to be the fallout of this project.

With Af-Pak relations strained, Pak has shunned Afghanistan & requested China to connect the CPEC to the OBOR (One belt one road) project to provide a link to Central Asian republics, bypassing Afghanistan where India has made substantial investments.  Ideally, if the aim is economic alone, it makes sense for India to connect the Delhi Mumbai industrial corridor to the CEPC & gain access to Central Asia rather than make further investments in connecting the Chabahar port in Iran via Afghanistan to Central Asia especially when Afghanistan continues to be in turmoil & our relations with Iran uncertain.  Pak realizes the strategic importance of the project & fearing sabotage is guarding the 7000 odd Chinese personnel working on the corridor with about 15000 soldiers.

What should be the Indian Response?

Hawks are convinced that dismemberment of Pak is the only solution. Severing Balochistan could cut off the Gwadar port - from the corridor - which China plans to develop as a naval hub. Here is assumption is that an independent Balochistan, cognizant of India's interest, would not allow the corridor or port to be developed by China; however, it is possible that looking at the economic benefits involved the Baloch leadership could allow China access effectively nullifying our efforts. While keeping the issue of Balochi response open, it is sane to assume that if Sindh continues to remain in Pak, then the Chinese could be expected to terminate the corridor at Karachi, nullifying the gains. Therefore, engaging Muhajirs – Indian Muslims who migrated to Pak in 1947 – largely residing in Karachi, smirking at being treated as second class citizens, could help achieve disturbances but not severance; other citizens of Sindh, who dominated the power apparatus, from 1947 & replaced by the Punjabi elite, since the 1960’s, could be tapped  &  resentment sharpened.  A better alternative would be to finish off the project at Gilgit- Baltistan, since it is technically Indian territory & the local population is seething with anger at the prospect of their traditional land holding being usurped by aliens. While evaluating all alternatives, it is important to find answers to 2 questions: Would an Indian action not lead to an ISI response?; Does dismemberment of Pak serve our purpose?

The Pak Army is about 5.5 lakh strong & dominated by Punjabis; the ISI too is dominated with a disproportionate representation from Punjab. Dismemberment of Pak shall not change the composition of either the ISI or the Pak army & they would continue their diatribe against India as they are wont to do now. They have not forgotten the ignominy they suffered against India in the 1971 war & further dismemberment or attempts in that direction would only accentuate these hard feelings, effecting peace in South Asia. If severed, the Pak armed forces would have only Punjab to defend, which they can do better, because of the principle of contraction defense; breaking of Punjab into smaller principalities is desirable to weaken the Pak Army but that is highly unlikely, unless "non state actors"like the LeT, JeM et al recoil on their patrons. Even if that does happen, India needs to be on guard for instability across its borders could always spell trouble.

China would not intervene in an Indo-Pak conflict unless it senses Pak annihilation. It needs Pak to continuously needle India & maintain an Indo-Pak narrative. Since CPEC helps China, to circumvent the Malacca Straits & gain access to the Middle East & Africa's natural resources at a cheaper cost, it would never ditch Pak. It is, therefore, important to step back & analyse if dismemberment of Pak would help us achieve out twin objectives of checkmating the Chinese & ensuring ever lasting peace with Pak. Obviously, there are no easy answers.

Kashmir Problem: Waiting For The Still Elusive Solution

The flamboyant Hizb ul Mujahedeen commander & social media star Burhan Wani’s killing by the armed forces has reintroduced bloodshed in the pristine valley with casualties on both sides – civilians & security personnel. GOI is fighting a Pak enhanced diplomatic offensive internationally & belligerent stone pelting crowds locally, the latter, perhaps influenced by the Palestine’s “Intifada” movement. 

Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) consists of Western Jammu districts of Muzzafarabad, Poonch & Mirpur - & the northern territories of Gilgit - Baltistan which accounts for about 46% of the J&K State.  “Aksai Chin” was occupied by China after the Indo- China war in 1962 & 5180 Sq. Kms of the Shaksgam tract was ceded to China by Pakistan soon after in 1963; thus the dispute has effectively become a tripartite one. The recent American foreign Ministry spokesperson calling for a settlement between India Pakistan & Kashmiris – leaving out China – makes it a tripartite problem, contrary to the Indian position that it is a bilateral problem to be resolved under the Shimla agreement of 1972. Surely, Pak or the US would not refrain from fishing in troubled waters unless we put our house in order.

Rajnath Singh – the Indian Home Minister – visited the valley but received a cold response with even the trade lobby refusing to meet him. A similar fate awaited the Joint parliamentary committee (JPC) that visited the valley later; a JPC when deputed in 2010 did cool tempers post a promise to constitute a committee to look into the whole imbroglio. The recommendations of the 3 member committee headed by Dilip Padgaonkar though were never acted upon.

The committee is supposed to have suggested greater autonomy – a reversal to the pre 1953 position - which would give J&K a PM & Sadr-i-Riyasat (A president equivalent) apart from the benefits of their own flag & 6 years elected term - unlike 5 years in Indian legislatures - which they currently enjoy. That would also entail the CAG & the Indian Supreme Court being off limits for J&K; off course all the other benefits under article 370 would still continue. 

The former Home Minister, P Chidambaram’s (PC) statement that the 1947 treaty of accession should be respected to give more autonomy to the state has BJPs  Prakash Javadeker quip that PC is “repenting at leisure” for the Congress never acted upon the Dilip Padgaonkar’s report. Clearly, a national consensus eludes the Kashmir imbroglio for where the Parties stand – on this issue – depends on where they sit – in the opposition or the ruling benches. Unless we evolve a national equanimity on this issue the problem is unlikely to be solved in a hurry accentuating the alienation in the valley further which does Indian democracy no credit. If we continue doing what we have done till date expecting a different result, we shall only be fooling ourselves. it is important to recall that Vajpayee attempted something different & despite roadblocks, his outreach did create a constituency in the valley.

Issues to ponder over

(1)Does it make sense for India to station about 50% of the 13 lakh strong Indian Army in Kashmir alone while Chinese aggression on the Northern borders has increased & we do not have budgetary leeway to raise additional battalions?

(2)Media channels were abuzz about how Rs. 100 crores was spent by Pak to formant the current mob violence; if such small amounts can prod people to the streets, then would Pak not continue with this low-cost disruptive game? If yes, does it not help engaging Pak to stop or reduce the flow of funds from across the borders as a first step to control domestic crowds?

(3)If the Hurriyat leadership is indeed rootless as proclaimed by many analysts, what does India lose by allowing Pak representatives access to them? Why does the Govt. approach them to control the intransigent crowds now?

(4) AFSPA has been in existence in the NE since 1958 & in Kashmir since 1990; should it not be used for short duration? What needs to be done post the Supreme Court strictures on the continued use of AFSPA?

(5)Are the J&K police performing what they see as merely their job to remain employed or are they wedded to the Indian cause? The answer to this question would indicate how different the J&K problem is to the erstwhile Punjab insurgency which was initially contained through police action & later eliminated through a deft political process initiated by P V Narsimha Rao.

(6)Do the mainstream political parties in the valley enjoy genuine political support or are they merely either hard-core separatists or soft separatists? Elected representatives, unable to curb mob violence & engage citizens, perhaps alludes to some answers.

(7)Is the increased interest in Indian civil service jobs by the Kashmiris a sign of their keenness to integrate with India or a long term plan to build their own bureaucracy?

(8)Does it make sense to draw RED lines on Pak representatives meeting the Hurriyat when India had allowed such meetings since the early 1990’s? Can we solve the Kashmir problem without engaging Pakistan when the Shimla agreement willy-nilly recognizes it as a player in the dispute?

(9)If ‘Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs” is seen as a bedrock of our foreign policy does it make sense for the PM to raise the issue of Baluchistan from the ramparts of the RED fort? Is it only a tactical negotiating ploy?

Possible Solutions

Kashmir is without doubt a “political problem” which needs to be handled by the political leaders since the Indian Army has done its job of weaning back the valley from the brink of separation in the 1990’s.  While India is keen on de-hyphenation with Pak, China would do everything possible to ensure continuance as part of its power calculus; this explains its veto on  Mahsood Azhar being declared an “International terrorist” or insisting on a rule based entry into the NSG.  A 2.3 million military & $146 billion budget puts China miles ahead of India’s 1.3 million military & $37 billion budget. Arraigned against Pak’s 0.55 million military & $7.6 billion budget, many Indians & national TV channels indulge in jingoism without the realization that India is in no position to fight a war on 2 fronts. A tilt towards the US is thus welcome especially when Russian tilt towards China is pronounced; keeping Russia in good humour on defence imports is critical to prevent the latter's tilt towards Pak.

The Pak Army budget at 3.5% of GDP is high; permanent enmity with India & encouraging lawlessness in Afghanistan is the only way it can retain its budgetary support & preeminent position. Therefore, political leaders have been either finished or propped up by the army from time to time; Bhutto’s hanging in 1979 on a trumped up murder trial, Nawaz Sharief being propped up in the 1980’s & dumped in 2001 or Imran Khan & Tahirul Qadri being supported now are part of these diligent chess moves. Not surprisingly, civilian governments in Pak, wary of being dethroned, have played footsie with their Army either by ratcheting up emotions on Kashmir or through anti- India rants. Any leader who tried to engage in peace talks with India incurred the Army’s wrath; Kargil happened soon after Vajpayee’s bus ride to Pak & Pathankot after Modi’s visit to Raiwind are cases in point. Does the trajectory of events indicate that Indo-Pak peace is a pipe dream? Perhaps, not.

There is no denying that the army – the sole arbiter of Pak destiny - along with the ISI is the only institution in Pak with the capability to implement bilateral agreements.  Mysteriously through, dictators who made  moves to arrive at some form of peace agreement & settlement were either killed or dethroned; Gen Zia’s air crash in 1988 or Musharraf’s loss of power in 2008 are examples. Clearly, the actors of the Pak deep state would pull all stops to maintain status quo & any deviations would not go unpunished.

The current Pak Army Chief, Raheel Sharief’s forefathers are from Kashmir & having seen his relatives - brother Shabbir & Uncle Raja Aziz Batti - die in the 1971 & 1965 Indo-Pak wars, has emerged as a hawk. Therefore, expect no change in Pak stance till he is in the saddle. Nawaz too post the Panama scandal revelations is a leader in limbo & hence expect nothing from him either. Therefore, PM Modi's strategy of investing too much of political capital on Nawaz was a politically short sighted act. Since China could encourage Pak’s actions even if we push the US to intervene on our behalf & India is in no position to hurt China by raising the Uighur issue in Xinjiang, the Tibetan issue should be activated, to cause them some diplomatic headache.  

Engaging Pak is helpful only if the Army is in the saddle vide a military takeover or a Pak PM of the Erdogan’s stature emerges, whose sheer popularity muscles the Army into submission. Neither is going to happen soon.

The Way forward

Short Term plan - A joint parliamentary committee visiting J&K can generate nothing but good optics. Engaging the moderate separatists of the Hurriyat & keeping people like Ali Shah Geelani at bay shall send the right signals. Geelani or groups like the Hizb or Lashkar shall fall in line once engagement with Pak is initiated at a later date.

Announcing the withdrawal of pellet bullets & free medical treatment to all those maimed for life could generate empathy. Replace pellets with rubber bullets or PAVA shells while dealing with the hoi polloi so as to make a differentiation between terrorists & citizenry.  Proclaiming a phased removal of the AFSPA shall help.

Medium Term Plan – There is no substitute to engaging Pak, since any agreements signed between the Indian Govt. & the Kashmiri leadership shall be negated by Pak sponsored destabilisers. There are only 3 ways left to solve the problem

 (1)A solution similar to the one adopted to solve problems of Northern Ireland by England, Quebec by Canada or the Basque by Spain. This solution too would involve Pak just as Ireland was involved by England to renounce their claim on Northern Ireland as part of a tripartite deal.

(2)India & Pak agree to convert the LOC into an international border & make the borders between POK & J&K irrelevant to allow reunions among families separated in 1948. Open borders especially with ISIS or terror cells across the border might not pass security muster though.

Both the solutions also have the problem of setting a precedent which other states especially of the NE could demand too. A deft negotiation of this labyrinthine maze would be a stress test to the Indian interlocutors.

(3)India declares Ladakh – dominated by Buddhists - a Union territory, a local demand for many years & divides the Hindu dominated Jammu as a separate state; Pak is likewise encouraged to absorb Northern territories as a separate state of Pak. The problem is thus treated as only a bilateral one between India & Pak as envisaged in the Shimla Agreement; without support from across the border it would become extremely difficult for separatists in the valley to sustain disruption or an armed insurgency. India & Pak should agree to convert the LOC into an international border. 

This strategy appears unlikely since India is contemplating to call J&K as Jammu, Kashmir & Ladakh. An agreement with Pak would also necessarily entail a withdrawal of our moral support to the Baloch cause.  

If the idea is to involve Kashmiris then Kashmir state alone - & not Jammu & Ladakh could be given some degree of additional powers within the contours of the Indian constitution although it risks setting a precedent. Integration of Jammu & Ladabh minus article 370 can be tom-tommed by the BJP as a victory.

Conclusion

When the civil society of a country or its part revolts – either on its own or through abetment – it becomes the responsibility of the state to engage to remove grievances. Kashmiri Pandits who have become refugees in their own country also need to be settled. The Vajpayee template is perhaps the only solution.