Kashmir Problem: Waiting For The Still Elusive Solution

The flamboyant Hizb ul Mujahedeen commander & social media star Burhan Wani’s killing by the armed forces has reintroduced bloodshed in the pristine valley with casualties on both sides – civilians & security personnel. GOI is fighting a Pak enhanced diplomatic offensive internationally & belligerent stone pelting crowds locally, the latter, perhaps influenced by the Palestine’s “Intifada” movement. 

Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) consists of Western Jammu districts of Muzzafarabad, Poonch & Mirpur - & the northern territories of Gilgit - Baltistan which accounts for about 46% of the J&K State.  “Aksai Chin” was occupied by China after the Indo- China war in 1962 & 5180 Sq. Kms of the Shaksgam tract was ceded to China by Pakistan soon after in 1963; thus the dispute has effectively become a tripartite one. The recent American foreign Ministry spokesperson calling for a settlement between India Pakistan & Kashmiris – leaving out China – makes it a tripartite problem, contrary to the Indian position that it is a bilateral problem to be resolved under the Shimla agreement of 1972. Surely, Pak or the US would not refrain from fishing in troubled waters unless we put our house in order.

Rajnath Singh – the Indian Home Minister – visited the valley but received a cold response with even the trade lobby refusing to meet him. A similar fate awaited the Joint parliamentary committee (JPC) that visited the valley later; a JPC when deputed in 2010 did cool tempers post a promise to constitute a committee to look into the whole imbroglio. The recommendations of the 3 member committee headed by Dilip Padgaonkar though were never acted upon.

The committee is supposed to have suggested greater autonomy – a reversal to the pre 1953 position - which would give J&K a PM & Sadr-i-Riyasat (A president equivalent) apart from the benefits of their own flag & 6 years elected term - unlike 5 years in Indian legislatures - which they currently enjoy. That would also entail the CAG & the Indian Supreme Court being off limits for J&K; off course all the other benefits under article 370 would still continue. 

The former Home Minister, P Chidambaram’s (PC) statement that the 1947 treaty of accession should be respected to give more autonomy to the state has BJPs  Prakash Javadeker quip that PC is “repenting at leisure” for the Congress never acted upon the Dilip Padgaonkar’s report. Clearly, a national consensus eludes the Kashmir imbroglio for where the Parties stand – on this issue – depends on where they sit – in the opposition or the ruling benches. Unless we evolve a national equanimity on this issue the problem is unlikely to be solved in a hurry accentuating the alienation in the valley further which does Indian democracy no credit. If we continue doing what we have done till date expecting a different result, we shall only be fooling ourselves. it is important to recall that Vajpayee attempted something different & despite roadblocks, his outreach did create a constituency in the valley.

Issues to ponder over

(1)Does it make sense for India to station about 50% of the 13 lakh strong Indian Army in Kashmir alone while Chinese aggression on the Northern borders has increased & we do not have budgetary leeway to raise additional battalions?

(2)Media channels were abuzz about how Rs. 100 crores was spent by Pak to formant the current mob violence; if such small amounts can prod people to the streets, then would Pak not continue with this low-cost disruptive game? If yes, does it not help engaging Pak to stop or reduce the flow of funds from across the borders as a first step to control domestic crowds?

(3)If the Hurriyat leadership is indeed rootless as proclaimed by many analysts, what does India lose by allowing Pak representatives access to them? Why does the Govt. approach them to control the intransigent crowds now?

(4) AFSPA has been in existence in the NE since 1958 & in Kashmir since 1990; should it not be used for short duration? What needs to be done post the Supreme Court strictures on the continued use of AFSPA?

(5)Are the J&K police performing what they see as merely their job to remain employed or are they wedded to the Indian cause? The answer to this question would indicate how different the J&K problem is to the erstwhile Punjab insurgency which was initially contained through police action & later eliminated through a deft political process initiated by P V Narsimha Rao.

(6)Do the mainstream political parties in the valley enjoy genuine political support or are they merely either hard-core separatists or soft separatists? Elected representatives, unable to curb mob violence & engage citizens, perhaps alludes to some answers.

(7)Is the increased interest in Indian civil service jobs by the Kashmiris a sign of their keenness to integrate with India or a long term plan to build their own bureaucracy?

(8)Does it make sense to draw RED lines on Pak representatives meeting the Hurriyat when India had allowed such meetings since the early 1990’s? Can we solve the Kashmir problem without engaging Pakistan when the Shimla agreement willy-nilly recognizes it as a player in the dispute?

(9)If ‘Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs” is seen as a bedrock of our foreign policy does it make sense for the PM to raise the issue of Baluchistan from the ramparts of the RED fort? Is it only a tactical negotiating ploy?

Possible Solutions

Kashmir is without doubt a “political problem” which needs to be handled by the political leaders since the Indian Army has done its job of weaning back the valley from the brink of separation in the 1990’s.  While India is keen on de-hyphenation with Pak, China would do everything possible to ensure continuance as part of its power calculus; this explains its veto on  Mahsood Azhar being declared an “International terrorist” or insisting on a rule based entry into the NSG.  A 2.3 million military & $146 billion budget puts China miles ahead of India’s 1.3 million military & $37 billion budget. Arraigned against Pak’s 0.55 million military & $7.6 billion budget, many Indians & national TV channels indulge in jingoism without the realization that India is in no position to fight a war on 2 fronts. A tilt towards the US is thus welcome especially when Russian tilt towards China is pronounced; keeping Russia in good humour on defence imports is critical to prevent the latter's tilt towards Pak.

The Pak Army budget at 3.5% of GDP is high; permanent enmity with India & encouraging lawlessness in Afghanistan is the only way it can retain its budgetary support & preeminent position. Therefore, political leaders have been either finished or propped up by the army from time to time; Bhutto’s hanging in 1979 on a trumped up murder trial, Nawaz Sharief being propped up in the 1980’s & dumped in 2001 or Imran Khan & Tahirul Qadri being supported now are part of these diligent chess moves. Not surprisingly, civilian governments in Pak, wary of being dethroned, have played footsie with their Army either by ratcheting up emotions on Kashmir or through anti- India rants. Any leader who tried to engage in peace talks with India incurred the Army’s wrath; Kargil happened soon after Vajpayee’s bus ride to Pak & Pathankot after Modi’s visit to Raiwind are cases in point. Does the trajectory of events indicate that Indo-Pak peace is a pipe dream? Perhaps, not.

There is no denying that the army – the sole arbiter of Pak destiny - along with the ISI is the only institution in Pak with the capability to implement bilateral agreements.  Mysteriously through, dictators who made  moves to arrive at some form of peace agreement & settlement were either killed or dethroned; Gen Zia’s air crash in 1988 or Musharraf’s loss of power in 2008 are examples. Clearly, the actors of the Pak deep state would pull all stops to maintain status quo & any deviations would not go unpunished.

The current Pak Army Chief, Raheel Sharief’s forefathers are from Kashmir & having seen his relatives - brother Shabbir & Uncle Raja Aziz Batti - die in the 1971 & 1965 Indo-Pak wars, has emerged as a hawk. Therefore, expect no change in Pak stance till he is in the saddle. Nawaz too post the Panama scandal revelations is a leader in limbo & hence expect nothing from him either. Therefore, PM Modi's strategy of investing too much of political capital on Nawaz was a politically short sighted act. Since China could encourage Pak’s actions even if we push the US to intervene on our behalf & India is in no position to hurt China by raising the Uighur issue in Xinjiang, the Tibetan issue should be activated, to cause them some diplomatic headache.  

Engaging Pak is helpful only if the Army is in the saddle vide a military takeover or a Pak PM of the Erdogan’s stature emerges, whose sheer popularity muscles the Army into submission. Neither is going to happen soon.

The Way forward

Short Term plan - A joint parliamentary committee visiting J&K can generate nothing but good optics. Engaging the moderate separatists of the Hurriyat & keeping people like Ali Shah Geelani at bay shall send the right signals. Geelani or groups like the Hizb or Lashkar shall fall in line once engagement with Pak is initiated at a later date.

Announcing the withdrawal of pellet bullets & free medical treatment to all those maimed for life could generate empathy. Replace pellets with rubber bullets or PAVA shells while dealing with the hoi polloi so as to make a differentiation between terrorists & citizenry.  Proclaiming a phased removal of the AFSPA shall help.

Medium Term Plan – There is no substitute to engaging Pak, since any agreements signed between the Indian Govt. & the Kashmiri leadership shall be negated by Pak sponsored destabilisers. There are only 3 ways left to solve the problem

 (1)A solution similar to the one adopted to solve problems of Northern Ireland by England, Quebec by Canada or the Basque by Spain. This solution too would involve Pak just as Ireland was involved by England to renounce their claim on Northern Ireland as part of a tripartite deal.

(2)India & Pak agree to convert the LOC into an international border & make the borders between POK & J&K irrelevant to allow reunions among families separated in 1948. Open borders especially with ISIS or terror cells across the border might not pass security muster though.

Both the solutions also have the problem of setting a precedent which other states especially of the NE could demand too. A deft negotiation of this labyrinthine maze would be a stress test to the Indian interlocutors.

(3)India declares Ladakh – dominated by Buddhists - a Union territory, a local demand for many years & divides the Hindu dominated Jammu as a separate state; Pak is likewise encouraged to absorb Northern territories as a separate state of Pak. The problem is thus treated as only a bilateral one between India & Pak as envisaged in the Shimla Agreement; without support from across the border it would become extremely difficult for separatists in the valley to sustain disruption or an armed insurgency. India & Pak should agree to convert the LOC into an international border. 

This strategy appears unlikely since India is contemplating to call J&K as Jammu, Kashmir & Ladakh. An agreement with Pak would also necessarily entail a withdrawal of our moral support to the Baloch cause.  

If the idea is to involve Kashmiris then Kashmir state alone - & not Jammu & Ladakh could be given some degree of additional powers within the contours of the Indian constitution although it risks setting a precedent. Integration of Jammu & Ladabh minus article 370 can be tom-tommed by the BJP as a victory.

Conclusion

When the civil society of a country or its part revolts – either on its own or through abetment – it becomes the responsibility of the state to engage to remove grievances. Kashmiri Pandits who have become refugees in their own country also need to be settled. The Vajpayee template is perhaps the only solution.