Does The US Want A Civil War In Afghanistan?

 

The Aug 2021 videos of American troops, struck at Kabul airport, Afghanistan (Af), invited comparisons with the photos of Americans atop their embassy, at Saigon, in April 1975, desperately awaiting evacuation. Captions proclaimed a Vietnam redux with dire predictions, warning of the end of the Unites States’ (US) world domination. Snatching Af from the Taliban, in 2001 & tamely handing over the territory in 2021, after spending over $1 Trillion, losing 2442 soldiers & 3846 private contractors & obligation of lifetime care to over 20,000 military veterans, rightfully, invokes ridicule.

 

Obituaries of the US, as a superpower, though, are vastly exaggerated. It must be remembered that the US, quickly recovered from its ignominious exit from Vietnam, in 1975, & intervened in Afghanistan, by 1980, training the Mujahedeen, to counter the Soviet invasion, helping breakup its ideological adversary, the USSR, leading to the onset of the unipolar world order. Don’t bet against the US repeating the act.

 

Against the aforementioned background, there are 2 intriguing questions:

 

(1)Has the US, exited Afghanistan, to concentrate on its main challenger China, in the Indo-Pacific?

 

(2)Does the US, deliberately, want a civil war in Af to create nuisance to its strategic competitors – Russia & China – in their backyard?

 

 

The US Pivot

The President of the US (POTUS), Biden’s statement, on 16^th August, provides some clues on American strategy. He clarified ”our mission should be narrowly focussed on counterterrorism – not counterinsurgency & nation building”. Emphasizing that degrading al Qaeda & preventing the use of Af as a base for terror activity & hunting down the culprit of 9/11 Osama Bin Laden were objectives achieved a “decade ago” he wanted that the US to “focus on the threats we face today in 2021 – not yesterday’s threats. And our true strategic competitors – China & Russia – would love nothing more than the US to continue funnel billions of dollars in resources & attention in stabilizing Af indefinitely.”

 

As per Jeffrey Sachs, Professor Colombia University, & President of UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, the US, between 2001-21, invested $946 billion ($47 billion per annum) - $816 billion for US troops, $83 billion to Afghan Security forces, $10 billion on drug interdiction operations, $15 billion on US agencies operating in Afghanistan leaving a meagre $21 billion ($1 billion per annum) in ‘economic support” funding. He argues for funding healthcare, education, nutrition etc. ‘together with other nations through institutions like the Asian Development bank”. The inference from the data points indicates that over 98% of the US spends went to its own Military industrial complex which it can redeploy into the Indo-Pacific to contain China; it can continue spending the $1 billion as “economic support” to Af. Unsurprisingly, the Taliban aware of such a reality are keen to woo China to write the cheques.

 

 

US plan to encourage instability in Central Asia & trap Russia & China

 

My hypothesis is borne out by the following sequence of events:

 

Dec 28^th 2014: US & North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) formally end combat operations in Af & reduce force size to 13000 - to train Afghan troops. 

 

Sept 2018: US appoints an experienced hand as Special representative for Afghan reconciliation; Zalmay Khalilzad, an ethnic Pashtun - the largest ethnic group in Af - earlier worked as ambassador to Af (2004-05), Iraq(2005-07) – during which time he helped craft their constitution & conduct elections - & UN(2007-09).

 

Oct 2018: Abdul Ghani Barader, a co-founder of the Taliban, who was jailed by Pakistan, since 2010, for being in touch with Af President Hamid Karzai (2002-14) & broaching rapprochement was released at US insistence He led the Taliban peace talks with US at Doha, Qatar.

 

Oct 2020: US removes KTIM (East Turkistan Islamic Movement) from the list of “Terrorist organizations’”, after nearly 2 decades, to weaken China’s brutal crackdown in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region. While China wants the Taliban to eliminate the ETIM & is offering investment via the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) as a carrot, it will not be surprising if the US wills otherwise.

 

July 2021: US forces exit Bagram Air base – their nerve centre – overnight without even informing the Afghan counterparts.

 

Aug 2021: US completes withdrawal from Af but leaves behind 200 aeroplanes & helicopters, 75000 vehicles including Humvees, 6 lakh small arms which now lies in Taliban hands. 46 Afghan aircrafts scrambled into neighbouring Uzbekistan, escaping the Taliban who now want them back while the US has not cared to offer them immigration support. US had frozen $9.5 billion of overseas assets of the Afghan central bank though & thus continues to hold leverage on the regime.

 

In the UN Security Council meeting on 30/8/21, Russia & China abstained from the vote on resolution 2593, since the joint Sino-Russian proposal to brand some organizations like ETIM as terrorist organizations was not accepted. The “chaos in Af is a direct result of the hasty withdrawal of troops” China averred.

 

The abrupt US withdrawal, chillingly, appears to have been copied from the playbook of the British, who left India, in 1947, preponing their handover date, creating avoidable fissures, in the sub- continent, that remain to this day. It appears that the US wants a volatile Af with its consequent tremors in other Central Asian republics to trap their strategic competitors – Russia & China. Games that great powers play!! 

 

Why did the Afghan forces fall like a pack of cards?

 

It was indeed surprising how a 3 lakh strong Afghan National Army (ANA) with a supporting air force fell against a 75000 strong Taliban without one. Biden conceded that ‘this did unfold more quickly than we anticipated. The Afghan military collapsed, sometimes without trying to fight. Af political leaders gave up & fled the country”.

 

India too appeared to be caught unawares as it was, perhaps, betting that the Ashraf Ghani regime shall survive, for some more time, if not for 3 years like the Najibullah did, post the Soviet retreat in 1989.

 

Strategic analyst, Ajai Shukla, with the Business Standard, has an interesting analysis on the ANA retreat. He alludes to the Afghani tradition of settlements & payoffs before the battle & argues that it is based on the principle of “survival” & not “cowardice” – as “there is no glory in fighting to the last man, or even to the point of dissipating one’s strength to the point where the next engagement is jeopardised. Centuries of hard experience in Af has proved that a defeated commander or one whose army has suffered heavy losses badly loses credibility. Commanders avoid grave attrition, negotiating with the enemy or defecting along with troops live to fight another day & avoid damage to their reputation.”

 

He adds that the ANA is not fighting hard against the Taliban as they realize that the wind had shifted & the eventual outcome of battle would be to their detriment & money has changed hands. He shares his experience, as a reporter, in 2001, attending a negotiation between the Northern alliance commander & a Taliban commander with the latter agreeing to withdrew, a few hours before the former’s attack & it played out as per the plan. He predicts that it could very well be the same pragmatic Taliban militiamen who retook Kabul lately.

 

In popular folklore Afghans are “brave & proud” people while foreigners - are “treacherous meddlers not to be trusted”. In the Afghan worldview, negotiating a defection with another Afghan faction is usually permissible, but capitulating to a foreigner bears the stigma of disgrace. That he explains is the reason why generals like Rashid Dustum have defected more than once between various afghan factions without loss of reputation.

 

Finally, all bets are off when Afghan fighters smell victory.  That explains the Taliban entering Kabul on 15^th Aug despite promises to the contrary just as the Northern alliance entered Kabul, in Nov 2001, despite promises to the US not to enter Kabul until it approves. Capturing Af seat of power would be far more useful than a reputation for sticking to promises he concludes.

 

Conclusion:

President Biden has conceded that withdrawal from Af has been “hard & messy’ & “far from perfect”. Surely, they would have avoided the humiliation of Taliban taking over Kabul &  Ashraf Ghani taking flight even while their forces were yet to withdraw from Af, had they anticipated it. Furthermore, he added that the US has developed “over the horizon capability” indicating that the US plans to achieve its counterterrorism objectives, henceforth, without boots on the ground. The way forward was elucidated thus: “Human rights must be the centre of our foreign policy” achieved “not through endless military deployments” but with “diplomacy, our economic tools & rallying the world to join us”. The obituary of the US as a superpower is thus premature.

 

The US appears keen to pivot to the Indo-Pacific to take on its new challenger – China. Leaving Af in a mess, just as the British did India, in 1947, could be a strategy to create a volatile Central Asia – forcing its strategic competitors - China & Russia - to be busy dousing flames in their backyard, controlling warring factions, preventing terror & drug trade. By removing the ETIM, from the list of terror organizations, in Oct 2020, US appears to have expressed its intentions to support an insurrection in Xinjiang, China. Will China perish playing the great game in the “graveyard of empires” like its predecessors – the British, Soviets & recently the US or will it emerge with a new successful template to manage the region? Only time will tell.