The India, China & Pakistan Bilateral Peace Overtures – the Crux

The Feb 10^th 2021 announcement on “synchronized & organized “Indo-China disengagement, from the North & South banks of the   Pangong Pso - in line with the consensus reached, during the 9^th Corp commander level talks, on Jan 24^th, with the region between Finger 3 & 8 temporarily becoming a no patrolling zone & removal of all constructions, since April 2020 – potentially, brings to an end a 9 month standoff.  Indians holding the commanding heights on the south bank of the lake, threatening the Chinese Moldo garrison, facilitated a compromise while the lack of a similar bargaining chip prevents Indians for effecting a similar Chinese withdrawal at the other friction points – Gogra, Hot Springs & Depsang. Chinese advantage at these points  threaten the DSDBO Road (Darbuk Shyok Daulet Beg Oldie Road) the lifeline to the critical Indian SSN (Sub sector North). Status quo ante, at these locations, is thus a mirage & likely loss of territory & “trust deficit” permanent. Sino-Indian relations, inevitably, shift from an era of “strategic competition” to “strategic rivalry”- the contours of which shall become more visible in the 2^nd half of the 21^st century.

Soon enough, on Feb 24^th, 2 days before the 2^nd anniversary of the Indian Balakot attack, a Joint statement was released by the Indo-Pak DGMOs (Director General of Military Operations). Such bonhomie, in quick succession, did evoke a considerable surprise. This statement alludes to respecting the Vajpayee-Musharraf LOC (line of Control) & IB (International Border) agreement, of 2003, & addressing “each other’s core concerns which have the propensity to disturb peace & lead to violence”. The “core concern” of Pakistan (Pak) is “Kashmir” while for India is “terror” & obviously, it is unlikely to find common ground.

Subramanian Swamy, the BJP’s rebel with a cause, has a point, when he tweeted: “Now you know the catch in the agreement.  Will we give up POK? Help Baluchis? Give autonomy to J&K? Scrap CAA? Or Pak will say we have broken the agreement” On the contrary, Swarajya, with its right wing slant opined that Pak facing the prospects of the likely drying up of  US aid - as the Afghanistan war nears conclusion - & the bitter experience of not finding support from the Gulf countries, on Kashmir, must have decided to follow a non-zero sum game. It is, however, more likely that the US forced the hand of both nations.

The Indo-Pak Detente

Avinash Mohananey, Ex Intelligence Bureau (IB), in his Economic Times article, suspects that the first policy statement of the US Joe Biden administration released on 4^th Feb 2021, on countering the growing ambitions of China to rival the US” & “determination of Russia to damage & disrupt our democracy” & keenness to restore the habits of rebuilding the muscle of democratic alliances, that had atrophied, heralds the genesis of a new cold war. While the Indian tilt towards the US is visible, the US must have initiated steps to woo Pak out of a tight China embrace, to aid its troop withdrawal from Afghanistan with the promise of Kashmir on the table when talks resume.

 The following sequence of events justifies the interpretation:

2^nd Feb 2020: Gen Bajwa’s calls for a “dignified & respectable solution as per the aspirations of the people of J&K” 

5^th Feb 2020: Imran Khan says that Pak is ready for taking 2 steps forward if India takes one. On the same day India restores 4G telecom connectivity in entire J&K – frozen since Article 370, was written down, in Aug 2019.

11^th Feb 2020:  Statement by Moeed Yusuf, special advisor on National security & strategic policy planning to Pak PM: “If we want peace, we have to move forward;” & “everybody has to be rational not ideological”.

25^th Feb 2020: US spokesperson Jen Psaki welcomed the agreement “which is in our shared interest & we encourage both countries to keep building upon this progress”.

Musharraf Zaidi, a Pak commentator, too, subscribes to the view that this deal has the blessings of the Western powers.

The immediate “tactical” advantages on offer:

(a)Afford Pakistan leeway to partially redeploy its forces back to FATA from the Indian borders as per Michael Kugelman- Deputy Director of the Asia Program at the Wilson Centre.

(b)Help the BJP concentrate its efforts on the impending state elections at Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Pondicherry & Assam.

As per Ambassador Vivek Katju, an opening to normalize relations with India has eluded General Bajwa till date. The FATF (Financial Action task Force) pressures, crippling the Pak economy & the advantage of cooling the Indian borders, to play an end game, in Afghanistan, post the US withdrawal may have influenced his thinking. Just as India is not keen on a “hot border” with China as the latter is 5 times its economic size, Pak too could have calculated the costs of fighting India 10 times its economic size. Prof Happymon Jacob, of the JNU (Jawaharlal Nehru University) says that the Indian govt. too must have realized that a state cannot be run on escalatory rhetoric alone.

“History repeats itself, first as a tragedy, & then as a farce” said Karl Marx & the Indo-Pak relations have followed that template dutifully. The DGMOs, of both nations, made a similar promise, in May 2018, to respect the 2003 ceasefire pact in “letter & spirit” only to witness its violation immediately thereafter. Furthermore, Imran Khan, since the last 1 year, has been accusing Prime Minister Modi of fascism & the latter who takes his international image too seriously would not have taken it kindly. Similarly, as per the Indian Home Ministry, Pak ceasefire violations increased from 2140 in 2018, 3479, in 2019 to 5133 incidents in 2020; considering the huge upside, in 2020, it is safe to interpret that the increase, coinciding with the Indo-China Ladakh skirmish, proves yet again that Pak is a satellite state of China, more so after CPEC (China Pak Economic Corridor). Therefore, it is reasonable to factor in a ‘trust deficit” & the unlikelihood of the resumption of people to people contacts or trade – which anyway is meager, & gets, largely, routed through the UAE otherwise. India must, therefore, forever, be ready for a 2.5 front war - first enunciated by CDS (Chief of Defence Services) Gen. Bipin Rawat. The 2 fronts are China & Pak while the half refers to the internal secessionist forces operating within the Indian borders.

Takeaways from the Indo-China conflict

(a) The Indian side was led by Lt. Gen PGK Menon, Commander XIV corps – responsible for the LAC in Eastern Ladakh & Navin Srivastava, Additional Secretary (East Asia), Ministry of External Affairs, while the Chinese side was led by Major General Liu Lin – Commander of the South Xinjiang Military region. A Major General is one level below a Lt. General & hence a protocol violation, implying that China do not consider India an equal. India, prudently, should have downgraded the level of talks to that of a Major General & absence of such an action is perhaps, a quiet acceptance of the power differential.

(b)The Indians lack a bargaining chip to force a compromise from the Chinese in Gogra, Hot Spring & Depsang plains. Why did the Indians not occupy similar strategic areas - as they did in Pangong along the aforementioned areas, or elsewhere, along the 3488 Kms border- to force a Chinese compromise; is the power differential inducing caution?

(c)The DSDBO road took 20 years to complete & now India has to invest on an alternate route since this road is within the shelling range of the Chinese artillery.

 (d)The raw courage displayed by the Indian soldiers at Galwan, on June 15^th 2020, which led to the death of 20 Indian & 45 Chinese soldiers– as per the Russian agency Tass, even as the Chinese claim only 4 casualties – implies that the Chinese, going forward, are more likely to avoid a physical confrontation, but could employ use of either

(1)their technological superiority in the Cyber, space & electromagnetic domains to force Indian compromises OR

(2)Use the clause VIII in the 2005 agreement on the “guiding principles for the settlement of the India-China boundary question” which reads thus: “in reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.”  China shall build new civilian settlements, in disputed border areas, as they have done at the Tsari Chu basin, Arunachal Pradesh & in Bhutan, recently, to achieve a fait accompli. 

(e)China share borders with 14 countries & they have settled them, largely, with 12 countries except India & Bhutan. Sun Yun, of the Stimson Centre, predicted that China is unlikely to settle the border with India since an Indian promise of neutrality in the emerging Sino-US conflict - even if made as part of a grand bargain on border settlement - can be violated by India while the boundary line, once marked, shall remain permanent. Expect China, therefore, to continue needling India to

(1)Force Indian troop concentration away from the Indian western border to protect “iron brother” Pakistan

(2)Weaken the emerging QUAD – the US-Australia-Japan-India – alliance, that largely is maritime focused.  Pressure on Indian land borders shall force India to spend more on the Army & less on the Navy – offering China space to strengthen itself even in the Indian Ocean, helping it expand beyond its traditional area of dominance in the Western Pacific.

Conclusion:

China, Pak & India entered into ,bilateral agreements aimed at cooling tensions, at the borders. While China now wants to focus its energies on the likely moves of the new Joe Biden US administration, either the US or China must have forced the Indo-Pak reconciliation.

While China has extended its control onto territory coinciding with its 1959 claim line & signaled to India to defer to its power superiority & put on notice, other nations, who wanted to prop India up either as a countervailing force to China or were hedging their bets. Having achieved both the objectives they have acceded to the disengagement in Pangong Pso – to eliminate the threat to their Moldo garrison even as they hold sway over Depsang, Hot Spring & Gogra. India is forced to pay the cost of creating an alternative to the DSDBO road - that now stands compromised. Shifting of resources to the Army would reduce the Navy's outlay & the effectiveness of the QUAD – which has more of a maritime significance - thereof. China now gets ready to engage the Joe Biden administration, perhaps, cooperate on climate change in lieu of reduced trade tensions - to prevent the success of the China+1 corporate strategy, of de-risking concentration of supply chains in China - which otherwise has the potential of strengthening countries in its neighborhood  like India, Vietnam, Indonesia etc. They shall be ready with a counter to the likely nit-pricks on human rights violations & suppression in Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong & Inner Mongolia & further arms sales to Taiwan.

Pakistan would use the deal to partially shift forces from the Indian border to FATA to suppress internal revolts & play the end game, in Afghanistan, coinciding with the US troop withdrawal, to prop up the Taliban to power. They would be keen that US & China pressurize India, to resume the comprehensive dialogue – that puts Kashmir on the table; resumption of  people to people contacts or trade are less likely & even if agreed to only add up to signalling alone. Supplies of Covishield, from India, supplementing Sinopharm, from China, could help with their vaccination efforts; India could acquiesce to such a request.

India could be relieved with the reduction of tensions with China even as the BJP sparks a counter narrative to the opposition accusation on loss of territory- a likely issue in the impending elections across 5 states. Thaw in relations with Pakistan for the govt., though, could be a temporary tactical retreat as escalatory rhetoric with its western neighbor has yielded impressive electoral dividends. Despite the new administration identifying both China & Russia as enemies, India could be keen to continue engagements with Russia – despite it being in a Chinese embrace – as over 60% of Indian military equipment is of Russian vintage needing spares & supplies as well as to prevent Russian equipment from being supplied to arch rival Pak. She would relish a situation where the Sino-US cold war escalates & accords India an opportunity to play a “swing power” – securing concessions from both sides in lieu of neutrality thereby ring-fencing “strategic autonomy”. But it is easier said than done; patient building of economic & military muscle over the next 15 years is the key to Indian strategic ambitions.