Are Indian Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) Safe?

The 7 phase Indian General Elections, started on April 11^th  2019, to elect the 17^th Lok Sabha -  the House of the People – the Lower house of India’s Bicameral legislature & soon enough the EVM controversy erupted again; opposition leaders alleged that buttons on some of the EVMs were missing, non- functional or wrongly favoured the ruling BJP.  The Election Commission of India (ECI) rejected the claims insisting that the EVMs are “tamper-proof”. There has been a long pending chorus to revert back to a paper ballot system.

While the ruling BJP, now, rubbishes the charges, it had levelled similar allegations post losing the 2009 general elections & the then ruling Congress Party called the charges “astonishing”. Incidentally, the BJP spokesperson GVL Narsimha Rao then wrote a book “Democracy at Risk!! Can we trust our Electronic Voting Machines?” with a foreward by its patriarch LK Advani & messages by  TDP’s (Telugu Desam Party) Chandrababu Naidu & Stanford University’s  Prof David Dill; Dill wrote “Electronic voting machines are especially vulnerable to malicious changes by insiders such as designers, programmers, manufacturers, maintenance technicians, etc. Of course, these problems are magnified enormously when the design of the machines is held secret from independent reviewers.” He thus alludes to all the usual suspects - the classic "insiders" - & the need for "transparency" which are legitimate observations..

Rather than dispense with the EVMs, activists have attempted to refine the process - a mature reaction to a problem. Subramanian Swamy, approached the Courts, in 2009, with a prayer, to issue a directive to the ECI, to incorporate a system of “paper receipt” as convincing proof to the voter - that the EVM has rightly registered his vote to the intended candidate - & secured a positive judgement, from the Supreme Court, in Oct 2013. The honourable court directed the govt. to extend financial assistance to the EC for VVPAT (Voter Verified Paper Audit trail) deployment. While demand for a recount, till then,  meant rerun of the EVMs,  it was to be replaced, going forward, by the recount of the paper receipts instead, creating greater "transparency". The cost as estimated, by the Court, in 2013, was a pittance Rs 1690 crores (13 lakh units X Rs 13000 per unit); since 2017, all Indian elections have been held with VVPAT enabled EVMs.

One nagging doubt still persists: If all loopholes have been successfully plugged, why do ruling parties, then & now, support EVMs, even while the opposition cries foul?

Brief History of EVMs in India

MB Haneefa invented the first Indian EVM, in 1980, & it was first used, in 1981, in 50 polling booths of the North Paravur constituency of southern state of Kerala; they were, finally, commissioned, in 1989; the 2004 general elections were conducted entirely on EVMs. The acknowledged advantages of EVMs include saving on paper, elimination of “invalid” votes & quicker announcement of results. Earlier instances of some cases of “invalid” votes being higher than the difference of votes polled by the winner & the first runner’s up, leading to demands for a recount & court battles, is now history. The key takeaway: 23 year delay from 1981-2004 is yet another instance of the famed boisterous Indian democracy's execution - deployment & course correction - mess that plagues governance. 

Controversies, however, continued to besiege the technological solution. In 2010, a techie, Hari Prasad claimed that the EVMs could be hacked & with a few hardware changes programmed to favour a particular candidate; he was criminally charged - for alleged theft of the EVM - to be dropped later only after sending across a chilling signal to all potential challengers.  As per an India Today Report, on May 12, 2017, by Prabhash K Dutta: In 2014, an EVM, in Jorhat, Assam, during a mandatory mock drill appeared to favour the BJP; the opposition lodged a protest with the ECI who claimed that the EVM was defective & assured that none of the faulty EVMs would be used; later, In 2017, at a mock drill to demonstrate VVPATs, the EVMs left a paper trail more for the BJP than the votes cast for the party; the EC on receiving complaints suspended 19 EC officials & claimed that the EVMs were used for demonstration without  sanitizing; similar complaints were received at Dholpur, Rajasthan, a few months later to which the EC clarified that of the EVMs received for the by-polls, 10 were found to be faulty with technical errors in the control unit - of which 8 were detected prior to voting & 2 during voting & prompt corrective action was initiated. The same year, Shrikant Shirshat, contesting from the Saki Naka ward of BMC (BrihanMumbai Municipal corporation), claimed that while he & his family members voted for him, in ward no 164, they ” disappeared” & he was shown as securing zero votes.

The discourse of EVM misbehaviour listed above does not enlighten us to distinguish between a case of “malfunction” – a technical defect in the machine which is legitimate – & “tampering” – manipulation aimed at fraud; hence the need to understand what is an Indian EVM like.

Indian EVM

EVMs consist of a control unit - that remains with the election official at a voting booth - a balloting unit - on which the voter casts his vote - & the VVPAT. They are run on batteries for ease of deployment even in areas without electricity. The machines are connected by a 5 metre cable & can record a maximum of 2000 votes. M2 EVMs (2006-10) can cater to a max of 64 candidates, while M3 EVMs (post 2013) can cater to a max of 384 candidates including NOTA – 16 per balloting unit connected sequentially.  An additional polling official is needed in booths where M2 EVMs are deployed to watch the VVPAT status Display Unit (VDSU) kept on the presiding officer’s desk while there is no such requirement for M3 EVMs. Cost of M2 EVMs (Balloting unit & Control unit) is Rs 8670/- & they have a lifespan of 15 years. Clearly, this Indian "Frugal Engineering" prowess is obviously a source of pride.

EVMs have other advantages including saving on paper & hence a solution to environmental degradation; instead of issuing a ballot paper, the polling officer enables the ballot button & the voter then can cast his vote in the secrecy of the voting compartment by pressing the blue button against the name & symbol of the candidate & visual & audio confirmations is received by a red light & a beep sound respectively. The VVPAT slip - containing the serial no. name & symbol of the candidate - gets displayed for 7 seconds before dropping into the box as an additional proof.  The voter can give a written complain if his vote preference does not match with the paper trail under rule 49MA, of the Conduct of Election rules, 1961; the polling officer shall warn the voter of the consequences of making a false declaration & on getting the written complaint arrange for a the voter to record a test vote in the presence of candidate or his polling agent present in the polling station & himself & allegation if found true arrange for stoppage of further counting of votes in the voting machine & inform the returning officer accordingly. This "warning", of punishment, if accusation is proved false could  turn away genuine complainants; HareKrishna Deka, former DGP (Director General of Police) of Assam, in April 2019, did not lodge a complaint when told that he could suffer from a 6 months imprisonment if his complaint was proved untrue. If an ECI order can intimidate a former top gun of the police force,  one can easily visualize the impact on lesser mortals; perhaps, ECI should tone down the order to instill confidence & deepen democracy. 

While this process takes care of malfunction during polling, how do we know if the EVM does not have any "hidden votes" already recorded?

Prior to the commencement of poll, the presiding officer presses the “result” button to demonstrates to polling agents present, the absence of hidden votes already recorded; a mock poll with at least 50 votes is then conducted to satisfy poling agents the match between the result stored in the control unit, VVPAT slip released & the choice recorded. Presiding officer then presses the “clear” button & the “total” button to show a “0” result before commencing actual poll. There is a “close” button to be activated -by the electoral officer – at the end of the voting day - to stop further voting.

ECI has instituted further checks & balances:

The arrangement of names of candidates in the ballot unit is in an alphabetical order: first for national & state recognized political parties followed by independents; sequence is contingent on candidate name & party affiliation & thus cannot be ascertained beforehand. The loading of names is done by the engineers of the manufacturers ECIL (Electronics Corporation of India Ltd) & BEL (Bharat Electricals Ltd).

EVMs are allocated to polling stations vide a two stage randomized process through an EVM tracking software developed by the ECI; the first at the district election officer level to allocate assembly constituency wise in the presence of political parties & the second randomization at the returning officer level to allocate them polling station wise in the presence of candidates or their agents.

ECI has always contended that the EVMs used in India are tamper proof since they are made from a “one time programmable chip” – which can neither be read or overwritten -  unlike EVMs used in US & other nations are not personal computer based & hence “cannot be accessed or connected to any external device vide the internet, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth or an USB”.

Is there a possibility of trojan horses being burnt into the chips used in EVMs?

Rajat Moona, Member of the Technical Expert Committee (TEC) an apex advisory on EVMs on VVPATs, to the ECI, in an interview, to the Economic Times, on Sept 13, 2018, states that blank chips are imported by Bharat Electronics Limited & Electronic Corporation of India Ltd & the source code developed & programmed by them is coded on the EVM chip & deployed in the new M3 EVM machines; the source code is also verified by the TEC. For VVPAT too source coding is done in India. He did not mention the details regarding M2 EVMs but had an explanation for VVPAT malfunctions.

“VVPAT, unlike an EVM, is a mechanical , not an electronic device & is always more vulnerable to error” & added that while VVPATs went through the rigor of 50 degree Celsius tests, root cause analysis of malfunctioning of VVPATs, in Bhandara & Gondiya bypolls, showed that exposure to direct intense sunlight caused errors. They were expected to be operated in an enclosed environment & in rooms & inherently come with sensitive sensors; a hood is now added to protect the sensors now.

ECI, to its credit, has been extremely prompt in addressing complaints & has run hackathons with an invitation to hack the hardware. while ECI’s explanations & checks & balances listed above are indeed comforting why have many countries, in the world, reverted back to using paper ballot?

International Experiences on EVMs

In this world of about 200 countries about 120 practice democracy & less than 40 countries experimented with EVMs & less than 20 persist with its use. Since EVMs are environmentally friendly – since they reduce paper usage - & ensure quick announcements of results – enhancing efficiency - why have all the democracies not adopted the process? Cost of the machines cannot be a reason since a tried & tested "frugal engineering" solution from India is readily available. Germany introduced EVM in 2005 but its constitutional court scrapped its usage, in 2009, on charges of lacking “transparency”, forcing the country to revert back to a paper ballot just like Netherlands & Ireland.

As per a BBC report: In 2017, EVMs used during the Venezuelan elections, allegedly inflated the actual turnout by at least a million votes while Argentinian politicians rejected e-voting plans fearing manipulation of results & on concerns of ballot secrecy; partial recount was carried out in the Iraqi elections, in 2018 following reports of technical glitches & EVMs became of source of contention in the presidential elections in Congo amid reports that they had not been thoroughly tested.

This raises the question:

Are the EVMs hackable?

University of Michigan scientists were able to change results by sending text messages from a mobile phone. Likewise, Dhiraj Sinha, of MIT, believes that rigging is possible with the use of a very small receiver circuit with an efficient antenna – perhaps, invisible to the human eye  to avoid detection; however mass scale rigging needs the connivance of the machine manufacturers & the ECI. Wireless hacking is contingent on the availability of a radio receiver containing an electronic circuit & an antenna & ECI claims EVMs contain so such circuit elements. Is it however possible that such bugs be introduced by unscrupulous elements during the periodic maintenance of the machines?

Saurabh Bharadwaj, a computer engineer & an AAP (Aam Aadmi Party) MLA, demonstrated on May 2017, in the Delhi assembly, with an EVM prototype, that it can be hacked. ECI, however, dismisses those claims.

Solutions:

Yogendra Yadav, of the Swaraj Abhiyan, in an article on June 6^th 2018, has argued that “any electronic gadget can be programmed & hence manipulated” & hence the focus should not be on the “design of the machine but the administrative protocols that govern its use”. Since Indian EVMs cannot receive external signals, it has to be individually fiddled. Likewise, the chip does not recognize party names or symbols but records votes by the serial no. of the candidate – which is arranged alphabetically by the candidate’s surname; thus  a machine needs to be fiddled after the candidates are finalized for each constituency & a particular EVM allotted – which is about 72 hours before polls.

He has suggested the following, to the ECI, to instill confidence, instead of “hackathon” challenges

(a)ECI must allow experts nominated by the registered party to examine random samples of new machines stored anywhere in the country

(b)Amend election rules to allow a voter to register an objection if he suspects that the paper slip did not match the party he voted for. If the booth records more than 1% (say) of such objections it should be made mandatory at the time of counting to match the EVM count with the paper trail count of that booth

(c) Publicity campaign to educate voters on VVPATs.

(d)Strict adherence to the rule of replacing a malfunctioning EVM within 30 minutes or ordering a re-poll.

(e)Alter the current counting pattern of simultaneously counting booth nos 1- 14 under  "round 1"; begin with matching EVMs & paper trail in one randomly chosen booth for each counting table; only if there is no mismatch, proceed with counting

(f)Candidates who finish 2^nd or 3^rd to be allowed to call for paper trail matching in any booth of their choice before the result is declared.

Former Chief Election Commissioner, SY Quraishi, echoes Yadav's views; writing in The Hindu on April 4^th he says “The top two runners-up in the constituency can choose any two VVPATs to be counted as they have the highest stake in the results. This would serve to do away with a large sample, as only four machines per Assembly would have to be counted to ensure public faith in the system. This is on the analogy of the highly popular and successful Umpire Decision Review System in cricket”While this might delay declaration of election results by a few hours, it would also help in ending controversies & harmful debates.

Apart from Yadav & Quraishi's sane views, other critics have suggested the following factors to be considered to arrive at a decision on EVMs 

(a)Large Electorate: In the 2014 Indian General elections, the electorate was 810 million & 550 million cast their votes; the figure for 2019 is about 900 million. Obviously, for such large no. of voters, EVMs are a better choice.

(b)Eliminate Ballot Stuffing & Ballot box seizing: Nalini Singh, in the 1990’s, telecast a program visually highlighting rampant booth capture & ballot stuffing & manipulation of the electoral process there-off; some critics have argued that EVMs have put an end to the same.

Others disagree; Chief Election Commissioner, TN Seshan, in the 1990s, cracking the whip, a more aware electorate courtesy the media & increased literacy levels & ECI conducting elections, in phases, under heavy protection of security forces cover, have contributed more to bring sanity. While booths capture by armed ruffians has the potential of being highlighted by the media or paparazzi in this era of CCTV cameras & smartphone ubiquitousness, digital capture of an EVM is inherently silent & hence more deadly. Gauhar Raza, writing in The Citizen, on 30th Mar 2017, raises a probing question: Even if individual candidates do have not have the material resources to launch a digital attack, is there a possibility of a political party or corporate houses with a history of crony capitalism or intelligence agencies of foreign nations attempting the same?

(c)No booth wise secrecy: During the era of paper ballots, votes across booths were mixed & counted so that none would know vote share across booths, helping the marginalized sections vote freely & fairly without the fear of retribution; however, this process has been dispensed with in the EVM era despite the availability of “Totalizer machines”. It is time to introduce these “Totalizer” machines.  

Since EVMs look a better bet because of the above listed reasons, debate has now shifted to:

How Many EVMs & VVPAT slips should be matched to instill confidence?

In March, 2019, 21 political parties approached the Supreme Court (SC) challenging the ECI guideline that VVPAT slips counting would take place only in one polling station in an assemble constituency or each assembly segment in case of a parliamentary constituency; generally a parliamentary constituency has between 5-8 assembly segments. Their plea that ECI be directed to verify 50% of VVPAT slips in each assembly segment of a Parliamentary constituency was rejected by the ECI vide an affidavit filed in the SC, on the ground that it would “enlarge the time required for counting to 6 more days”. This appears an unconvincing argument since the 7 phase general election is spread over 43 days & increasing it to 49 days is a small price to pay for sustaining “trust” in the EVMs & democracy; general elections.started on April 11^th & ends on May 19^th with the results to be declared on May 23^rd.   

ISI (Indian Statistical Institute) was tasked to define the sample size for verification & they reverted with a no. of 479, of the population of 10.35 lakh EVMs -to be used in the General Elections - at a confidence level of 99.9936% level; ECI contended that April-May Lok Sabha polls would cover 4125 EVMs & VVPATs which is 8.6 times the ISI recommendation.  Further, they apprised the Court on the infrastructural & logistical challenges of training & deploying manpower for the 50% exercise.

The SC, in 8th April 2019, ruled on randomly selecting 5 EVMs, for every assembly segment /constituency, instead of 1 proposed by the ECI; this will delay the counting process by 5 hours only, & results will still be declared on May 23^rd. The judgement is, however, silent on the course to be adopted if there is a discrepancy in the EVM & VVPAT count in at least 1 of the 5 EVMs; should 100% of the EVMs & VVPATs for that assembly segment be then counted & matched? The opposition has filed a review petition.

Conclusion:

Democracy gives moral legitimacy to a govt. which is contingent on the electoral process being “transparent” – votes are recorded & counted correctly -  “verifiable” – & in “secrecy”- provided by the anonymity of a secret ballot; VVPATs shall help in “transparency” & “verifiability” & use of “totalizer machines” shall help strengthen “Secrecy”.

It is clear that mass manipulation of EVMs in India is impossible but selective tampering is still a theoretical possibility with the connivance of the interested party, ECI & manufacture’s engineers or maintenance staff. Implementing the administrative protocols suggested by Yogendra Yadav is a solution that needs immediate implementation. Since “eternal vigilance is the price of liberty” polling agents at the booth level should keep their eyes & ears open to detect & prevent manipulation.

It is time for India to unite on an EVM solution, to be exported to other countries later, to increase our soft power further.