China has responded to the Indian
dare of allowing the Dalai Lama to Tawang by rechristening 6 towns – on April
14th - in Arunachal Pradesh, perhaps, to de-legitimise the Indian
claims on the same region – a policy they have followed earlier in the East
& South China Sea. Meanwhile in the summit
meeting between President Trump & Xi, the latter surprisingly acquiesced with the
US concerns on the whopping trade deficit of $350 billion by alluded to work on
the same as part of a strategy to reduce inflation in their own country– a first
during their bilateral talks till date; clearly, Trump appears to have stirred
the Taiwan pot & challenged the “one China” policy for a brief interlude,
only as a negotiating-bait & appears to be succeeding. The contrasting treatments meted out to India &
China is an eye opener; while China has cleverly avoided being branded as a “currency
manipulator” – a Trump election promise - India is at the receiving end of H1B
visa curbs, likely pressures on IPR (Intellectual Property Rights) especially on
pharma as well as Custom duties – 100% duty on Harley Davidson bikes being
specially mentioned.
The installation of the THAAD
missile system in South Korea & deployment of a nuclear submarine to
protect its ally against the North indicates that the US is unlikely to dump
its allies & carve out geographies with China under a G2 format; however, demands
for greater contributions – from NATO as well as countries like Japan, Korea
etc. - for providing a security architecture would definitely follow; the “pivot
to Asia” strategy might not have been dumped but relations with India would
become more transactional or quid pro quo; India, therefore, needs to hedge its
bets & perhaps the next stop of Arun Jaitley to Moscow (Apr 25-27th)
from Washington (Apr 21-23rd) along with the PMs visit to Israel, in
July, is part of the overall strategy of protecting her interests without leaning
too much on any one international power. However the Russia- China - Pak axis
might put pay to such plans. US-Russia working together would have provided us
much more strategic space; the impending relationship appears to be at the
crossroads, though, post the US Tomahawk missile attack on a Syrian airbase followed
by additional sanctions as a reaction to a purported chemical attack on
civilians.
While some elements of our nationalistic
belligerent media would like us to believe that we are squelching Pak in the
International forums & thumping her into a pariah status, the truth is that
Pak has moved closer into a Chinese embrace & is gaining from the $46
billion CPEC(China Pak Economic corridor) lifeline; Russia too - a cold war
enemy - has opened up to Pak as a counter to an Indian tilt towards the US
& has conducted joint military exercises & is planning arms sales;
clearly a Russia-Pak-China axis is emerging, burnished by an increased desire
to squeeze India out of Afghanistan. If
the CPEC joins the OBOR, Pak would be the strategic partner for all land locked
central Asian republics – burnished further by the Muslim brotherhood logic- &
serve as a gateway to the Arabian Sea enhancing their geo-political status
further. The solution is to rake up the demand on POK & Gilgit – Baltistan through
which the CPEC passes; the consequence of such action is no talks with Pak
& therefore a volatile valley; additionally, India needs to instigate the Balooch
rebels & prevent the completion of the Gwadar port. Perhaps, India is
working on both these strategies; the PM, unprecedentedly, has spoken from the
ramparts of the Red fort on the Baloch issue while Kulbhushan Yadav too was purportedly
arrested from Baloochistan.
Pak’s economy is 1/8th
the Indian one while India is 1/5th the Chinese behemoth & it is
reasonable to assume that the military spends are a function of economic strengths;
spends however are no reflection of the numerical strengths; Indian military
(13 lakhs) is about 50% China’s (23lakhs)just as the Pak army (6.2Lakhs)is only 50% India’s;
all the 3 players are nuclear powers & can wreck the other if faced with
imminent annihilation; thus it is unlikely that China would replay 1962 despite
India pulling out the “Tibet card” to express
irritation to the Chinese opposition to Indian membership of the NSG or
preventing Masood Azhar from being
branded by the UN as international terrorist. However, since pestilence on two
fronts – Western & northern – if not a war is a highly likely outcome a
rapid roll out of Bharat Mala – the infra to match the Chinese on their side of
the border should be accelerated. Land
& rail connectivity vide Bangladesh & activating more of the dormant
air strips in the North east is an urgent need. A more broader engagement with
the North eastern insurgents to maintain peace is critical.
India’s “neighbourhood first” policy
seems to be in doldrums since relations with Nepal & Sri Lanka are
deteriorating while those with Maldives shows no improvement. In the 1990’s
India made a bid to cosy up with Iran & hence the Shia block with some
success & Iran reciprocated by supporting the Indian stand in the OIC on
Kashmir; attempts now to reach out to Saudi Arabia & UAE – the Sunni block –
has led to the Shia side being miffed; no support on the Kulbhushan Yadav issue
buttresses the assessment. Since about 7
million Indians work in the Gulf – largely in Saudi (2.8Million) & UAE (2
million), Kuwait (0.75Million), Oman (0.7Million), Qatar (0.6 Million) - & contributed about 60% of the 62
billion overall remittances last year, a GCC tilt is understandable; however
this would mean that Iran too - which has a strategic depth in Afghanistan - would
work towards evicting us from the region. Pursuing the Chabahar port
development & spends on creating infra to link Afghanistan & Central
Asia vide this port is therefore strategically illogical & hence should be
dumped.
Ideally, a democratic India
should have been logically a partner to western democracies post-independence;
however, since Pak was the UK creation & because of the then Indian
leadership’s own enchantment with socialism we moved closer to the USSR – a relationship
that served us very well though. Brexit would ensure that even countries like UK
support India more lured by a trade deal; however, the rise of right wing leaders
in Europe, in the impending elections, is likely to unravel the EU & Indian
diplomacy should rise up to the challenge.
With Europe on the boil, Africa
& Latin America should be the continents that Indian diplomacy needs to
concentrate hard on. The Chinese have made deep inroads here already & our
resources do not permit a headlong attack; use of soft power – like the US -
would be a better alternative. The US attracted the best students from across
the world to its Universities & the goodwill thus generated helped when
they returned to their home countries & rose to important positions in the
local govt. India needs to pursue a similar path but if criminal attacks on
African students continue & we refuse to acknowledge them as “racial
attacks’ the African project would unravel leading to an insurmountable damage;
the PM should persuasively speak about this issue at length in his “Man ki Baath”
& follow it up with ground level strategy. Tapping the NRI base in those countries should
be the other strategy.
The international situation is
fluid & calls for a long term strategic direction & tactical intervention
which calls for a larger diplomatic corps which is work in progress; with Trump
cocking a snook at the UN, we are likely to see the revival of bilateralism
& a weakening of international institutions; in such a scenario a foreign
secy. on a one year extension & a Foreign Minister who is not in the pink
of health post the kidney transplant would not help.
In the light of an unpredictable
US, a South Korea-Japan-Vietnam-Australia-India axis during the next 20 years
would serve India well; beyond such a period we need to plan to stand on our
own feet rather than lean on others. Rather others should be encouraged to lean
on us.
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